



It seems as if no one really knows the meaning of the term "public Trust" used in the Religious
Test Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. 7iis Article is the first scholarly attempt to
define the term by exploring historical evidence pre-dating the nation's jounding through the
Constitution's adoption, including British and colonial trust law that influenced the Founders'
conception of the term. Today, one can find the term used only in the cases and scholarship
concerning environmental aw, tax law and museum law. After a thorough analysis of the old
and new sources, this Article proposes the following original definition of term "public Trust":
"Any entity given special privilege by the government, beyond the simple grant of a state corporate
charter often coupled with state or federal tax waivers, so long as that entity is legally obligated to
engage in conduct that could traditionally have been performed by the government itself for the
public's benefit."
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"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and ju-
dicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office
or public Trust under the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added)
INTRODUCTION
The term "public Trust" used in the No Religious Test Clause of
Article VI, clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution largely has been ignored
since the Constitutional Convention of 1787-1791.' To date, no
scholarship or jurisprudence has defined the "public Trust" as it is
used in Article VI. It has been under-theorized in primary and sec-
ondary sources. Nonetheless, the term is being used with increasing
frequency in three distinct areas of legal jurisprudence and scholar-
ship: tax exemptions, environmental law and museum law. The pur-
pose of this Article is to analyze the historical and modern usage of
the term to define it and its future significance.
1 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
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One article written by Professor Robert G. Natelson in 2004 ex-
plains the prevalent idea of a fiduciary government among the
founders, which they referred to generally as "public trust."2 His work
cites use of the term during the Constitutional Convention; however,
it is a background discussion of the development of concepts of "pub-
lic trust" fiduciary government predating the Constitution, rather
than an analysis of what an Article VI "public Trust" actually is within
its Constitutional meaning. A few cases, books and other articles
have touched upon the phrase in passing, but none have sought to
define it.4 They focus on other terms in Article VI, such as what con-
stitutes a "religious Test."
Quite a few sources simply conflate the terms "Office" and "public
Trust" without asking the question whether the terms should, indeed,
be construed as having identical meaning. Such conflation is not
supported by basic principles of statutory and constitutional construc-
tion. Nor does historical evidence seem to support such equivalence,
although that evidence is sparse and ambiguous.
This Article is the first scholarly attempt to define the term "public
Trust." Part I of this Article will set forth the limited historical con-
text surrounding the term, dating back through the reign of the Stu-
arts, the Colonial Era, the Constitutional Convention and the new
Republic's early years. The term has been touched upon only in
three areas of law: (1) environmental regulations; (2) tax law (specif-
ically charitable trusts, non-profit theory and tax exemptions); and
(3) museum law. Part II analyzes these three legal fields to provide a
theoretical framework to conceive of a modern-day "public Trust."
Part III provides the following recognized original definition of the
"public trust": "Any entity given special privilege by the government,
beyond the simple grant of a state corporate charter often coupled
with state or federal tax waivers, so long as that entity is legally obli-
gated to engage in conduct that could traditionally have been per-
formed by the government itself for the public's benefit." Future liti-
gation and scholarship could consider whether modern public trusts
are subject to the limitations of Article VI's No Religious Test Clause
and how the clause potentially interacts with both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
2 Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1077, 1088
(2004).
3 Id. at 1091.
4 See e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 491 (1961); SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 78 (1902); WILLIAM W. SWEET, RELIGION IN
COLONIAL AMERICA 146-47 (1951).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARTICLE VI
Extraordinarily little historical evidence pertains to Article VI's No
Religious Test Clause, which concludes with the term "public Trust."
Modern usage of the term seems surrounded in myth. There is an
oversimplified belief among the populace that colonialists were flee-
ing religious persecution to build a society where all were free to wor-
ship as they saw fit, which is a falsity.' Official discrimination against
minority religious groups persisted throughout the Colonial Era and
beyond. The No Religious Test Clause was an attempt to stop such
discrimination in the new Republic, at least at the federal evel.
As demonstrated below, British and colonial history leading up to
the Constitutional Convention's adoption of the No Religious Test
Clause shows that the Clause's purpose was to eliminate any oath or
profession of faith to a state religion as a prerequisite for serving the
public interest. However, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution is
required before individuals may take an office, and during the
Founding Era, only those with religious convictions could take a valid
oath, with the effect of excluding atheists, agnostics, and other reli-
gious skeptics who could not profess a valid oath of faith." The histor-
ical record thereafter shows significant change in governmental prac-
tices through the present day, but there has not been a steady
progression towards tolerance of diverse beliefs concerning God and
faith. Change came in fits and starts, with some steps forward and
some back (depending on one's perspective, of course). The Su-
preme Court explained some of this history in Torcaso v. Watkins in
1961, where it summarized:
5 See, e.g., JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER TOLD ME: EVERYTHING YOUR AMERICAN
HISTORY TEXTBOOK GOT WRONG 77-97 (1995) (discussing American origin myths sur-
rounding early European migrations to North America); see also Note, An Originalist Anal-
ysis of the No Religious Test Clause, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1649, 1651-52 (2007) ("Like England,
many American states ... had constitutional provisions requiring individuals holding
public office to swear a belief in Christianity.").
6 Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina, on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (July 30, 1788) (remarks ofJames Iredell), reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 196-97 (Jona-
than Elliot e.d., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) (Federalist James Iredell
Sr. stated: "It was long held that no oath could be administered but upon the New Tes-
tament, except to a Jew, who was allowed to swear upon the Old. According to this no-
tion, none but Jews and Christians could take an oath; and heathens were altogether ex-
cluded."); see also 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (stating that individuals "elected or appointed to an
office of honor or profit" shall take an oath swearing or affirming their defense of and al-
legiance to the U.S. Constitution).
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When our Constitution was adopted, the desire to put the people "se-
curely beyond the reach" of religious test oaths brought about the inclu-
sion in Article VI of that document of a provision that "no religious Test
shall ever be required as Qualification to any Office or public Trust un-
der the United States."'
This Part fleshes out the historical evidence concerning the mean-
ing of the term "public Trust" from the Stuart Period through today
and sets forth interpretational principles to begin defining the term
with the precision lacking in prior scholarship.
A. The Stuart Period & Colonial Era
In 1660, Charles II became the head of the newly-restored English
monarchy following the collapse of Oliver Cromwell's republic.
Though King Charles II had previously stated a desire to encourage
religious tolerance of Catholic and Protestant dissenters, he was ulti-
mately convinced by his advisors that religious freedom would lead to
political rebellion." In 1661, he issued the Corporation Act.'o The
Act prohibited anyone from holding public office who had not, with-
in one year of being elected, "taken the Sacrament of the Lord's
Supper according to the rites of the Church of England."" The Cor-
poration Act was followed in 1673 by the anti-Catholic "Test Act,"
which required all public officials to declare "belief against transub-
stantiation in Holy Communion.",
It is true that one reason that the early colonists fled Europe to
settle in the "new world" was to escape the heavy burden of such
acts.3  Throughout the Colonial period, however, many colonial
leaders engaged in the very same oppressive behavior to support their
own faiths.4 Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and
7 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 491 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3.). See generally Donald Drake-
man, What's the Point of Originalism, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1123 (2014) (discussing
originalism and adherence to the Framers' intentions); Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Re-
ligion, 93 B.U. L. REv. 493 (2013) (discussing how courts deal with resolving religious
questions). The historical significance of Torcaso is debatable, however, and Constitu-
tional originalists may argue its holding was wrongly decided.
8 ANGUS STROUD, STUART ENGLAND 152 (1999) (discussing the collapse of the republic).
9 Id. at 157 (discussing Charles's policy of religious toleration and the reaction of local
elites to it).
10 ROWLAND HUNTER ET AL., ABSTRACT OF THE CORPORATION AND TEST ACTs 4 (1828).
11 Id.
12 AN ORIGINALIST ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 1650-51; Hunter, supra note 10, at 6. Transub-
stantiation is the Catholic belief in the changing of bread (the host) and wine to the body
and blood of Christ during mass.
13 See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490 (delving into historical analysis). But see Loewen, supra note 5,
at 76-97 (discussing myths about the Pilgrims).
14 Loewen, supra note 5, at 89-92; accord AN ORIGINALIST ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 1660.
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Pennsylvania required public officials to declare themselves Chris-
tians.'5 New York effectively excluded Catholics from office by requir-
ing all public officials to disavow allegiance to the Pope." Georgia,
New Hampshire, and South Carolina permitted only Protestants to
hold office." In colonial Virginia, Governor Thomas Dale decreed
that breaking the sabbath, cursing, or "speaking impiously" about the
Christian faith was punishable by death; under the Statute of Reli-
gious Freedom, Virginia required one to be a member of the Angli-
can Church to vote. A law passed in 1647 punished a Quaker priest
who entered Massachusetts for the second time by putting him to
death.' While Rhode Island permitted Protestants to achieve citizen-
ship and hold public office, it denied citizenship to Jews." Jews were
denied the right to hold political office throughout the colonies. In
sum, sanctioned discrimination was widespread throughout the colo-
nies. Consequently, the politically strong religious groups prevailed
22over the politically unpopular religious groups.
B. The Founding and Early Republic
In the era leading to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, it was
still a minority viewpoint that religious tests are incongruous with
democracy. In the eleven years between the signing of the Declara-
15 AN ORIGINALIST ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 1651-1652.
16 Id. at 1652.
17 Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A
Machine Thal Has Cone oftself 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681 (1987).
18 Brief for Madalyn Murray O'Hair, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Walz v.
Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (No. 135), 1969 WL 119906 at *8 (citing Cobb,
supra note 4).
19 Sweet, supra note 4. A litany of similar examples are discussed in Brief for Madalyn Mur-
ray O'Hair, supra note 18, at *9.
20 JOSEPH L. BLAU, CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 43 (1949) ("Let none
now think that the passage to New England by Sea, or the nature of the Country can do
what only the Key of David can do, to wit, open and shut he Consciences of men. Beside,
how can this be a faithful and upright acknowledgement of their weakness and imperfec-
tion, when they preach, print, and practice such violence to the souls and bodies of oth-
ers, and by their Rules and Grounds ought to proceed even to the killing of those whom
they judge so dear unto them, and in respect of godliness far above themselves?").
21 Stanley F. Chyet, The Political Rights of jews in United States: 1776-1840, AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES, April 1958, at 19 (explaining that Jews in Pennsylvania were naturalized, but
were not permitted to vote or hold public office, and that although Jews in South Caroli-
na and Georgia could vote, they could not attain public office after 1716).
22 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490 ("The effect of all this was the formal or practical 'establishment'
of particular religious faiths in most of the Colonies, with consequent burdens imposed
on the free exercise of the faiths of nonfavored believers.").
23 See Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution's Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article
VI Religious Test Ban, 38J. CHURCH &ST. 261, 269-70 (1996) ("Jefferson boldly challenged
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tion of Independence in 1776 and the start of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, most states cashiered their colonial charters in
exchange for state constitutions that included religious tests for pub-
lic office except Rhode Island and Connecticut, which revised their
liberal colonial charters rather than putting forth state constitutions
like the other states after the Revolution.24 Although "virtually all" of
these new constitutions "included sweeping affirmations of religious
liberty," most also continued to require religious tests for public serv-
ants.2 5 Though religious tests continued to resonate with states, fed-
eral conceptions diverged from the religious test requirement.26
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, religious diversity
among the colonies as a whole was an "undeniable reality."2 7  While
most early American settlers were Protestants, Roman Catholics28 and
Jews" made up sizable minorities.30 One contemporary noted the ex-
the view that one's religious opinion should affect one's civil capacities, including, pre-
sumably, fitness for public office .... These sentiments, however, reflected a decidedly
minority viewpoint. . . ."). See also Bradley, supra note 17, at 697 (discussing Jefferson and
the "relatively few [others] who opposed [religious] tests" as a measure of "fitness for
public station"). See generally David E. Maas, The Ideological and Political Roots of the Religious
Clause in the Constitution, 19 FIDES ET HISTORIA 32, 32-34 (1987) (discussing the history of
oaths in the colonial era); Philip K. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Consti-
tution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 839, 845-47 (1986) (discussing the history of oaths in
United States Constitution).
24 Dreisbach, supra note 23, at 264-69 (detailing the evolution of religious tests in state con-
stitutions); see also ALBERT H. PUTNEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAw LEGAL
HISTORY 193-95 (Cree Publ'g Co., 2d ed. 1910) (noting that Massachusetts, Rhode Is-
land, and Connecticut were charter colonies and were granted a great degree of freedom
for self-government by the Crown during the Colonial Era).
25 Dreisbach, supra note 23, at 265; see also STANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN AMERICA 510 (1902) (discussing how the Constitution only prohibited the fed-
eral government from implementing a religious test for public office, not the States, who
applied religious tests to those seeking state offices).
26 See Bradley, supra note 17, at 680, 696 (describing the differing views on religious tests
between the federal and state governments).
27 James E. Wood, Jr., "No Religious Test Shall Ever Be Required": Reflctions on the Bicentennial of
the U.S. Constitution, 29J. CHURCH & ST. 199, 203 (1987).
28 See Catherine L. Albanese, Religious Diversity in Early America, 13 EJOURNAL USA 7, 8-9
(2008), http://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/publications-english/EJ-faith-
0808.pdf (debunking the myth that early American settlers were exclusively Protestants).
Charles I gave the charter to settle Maryland to George Calvert, a Roman Catholic; the
charter's very existence is "testimony to the power of religious minorities in the colonial
era." Id. Pennsylvania, a Quaker colony, also welcomed Catholics. Id. at 9. Thomas
Dongan, governor of New York from 1682 to 1689, was a Roman Catholic, and Catholics
were tolerated in New York "for at least part of its history." Id.
29 Id. at 8. The first Jews in America settled in New York. Id. at 9. By 1692, they established
North America's first synagogue. Id. Later, Jewish immigrants "dotted East Coast cities
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istence of atheists in colonial America.3 ' And, while Protestants col-
lectively held the religious majority, members of that majority fell in-
to a vast array of religious sects, including Puritan, French Calvinist,
Quaker, Baptist, German Lutheran, and Anglican. Religious tests
were therefore highly impractical. Any sect-based constitutional reli-
gious test on a federal level would effectively "incapacitate more than
three-quarters of the American citizens for any public office"" and re-
sult in great regional schisms as different sects colonized different
parts of the new territory.
It was against this backdrop that South Carolina delegate Charles
C. Pinckney introduced the No Religious Test Clause at the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787, noting that it was a provision that the
world would expect in "an age so liberal and enlightened."' Conven-
tion delegate Oliver Ellsworth (later Chief Justice of the United
States) defined a religious test as "an act to be done, or profession to
be made ... for the purpose of determining whether his religious
opinions are such, that he is admissible to a publick [sic] office."
Maryland delegate Luther Martin observed that the clause "was
adopted by a great majority of the convention, and without much de-
bate." In fact, aside from one delegate's assertion that the clause
was "unnecessary, the prevailing liberality being a sufficient security
[against] such tests," there was no debate, and only North Carolina
voted against the Clause.37
Despite the ease with which the No Religious Test Clause was
adopted by the Convention, it became "one of the more controversial
31 Letter of Rev. Jonas Michaelius 1628, in NARRATIVES OF NEw NETHERLAND: 1609-1664, 123-
125 (J. Franklin Jameson ed., 1909).
32 Albanese, supra note 28, at 10. Professor Albanese notes that "[tihinking of the
Protestant settlers collectively .. . belies the situation of religious difference that actually
characterized these European immigrants. Many of them exhibited a cultural Protestant
Christianity but lived, too, in touch with a series of metaphysical beliefs and behaviors
akin to those of Indians and blacks-turning to the magical practice of cunning folk, to
astrological forms of guidance, and to elite forms of esotericism." Id. at 9.
33 Wood, supra note 27, at 204 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth) (internal quotations omitted).
34 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 468 (M. Farrand ed.,
1911); 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 app. A,
CXXIX, at 122 (M. Farrand ed., 1911).
35 Note, supra note 5, at 1654 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder, No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787),
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 640 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987)).
36 Bradley, supra note 17, at 688 (quoting Statement of Luther Martin to his state Legisla-
ture on Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in C. ANTINEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM
FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 100 (1964)).
37 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34 (noting that North Carolina voted against Pinckney's pro-
posal, while Maryland was divided in its vote).
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features" of the Constitution during ratification.38 Antifederalists
wholeheartedly opposed it.-" This opposition was primarily rooted in
fear that "'a Turk, aJew, a Rom(an) Catholic, and what is worse than
all, a Universal(ist) may be President of the United States.'"
Many felt it would be "at least decent" to make some distinction be-
tween Christians and "downright infidelity or paganism.
One scholar of the No Religious Test Clause concluded: "At this
juncture Jefferson (and perhaps a few others) maintained their view
that a man's religious belief had no bearing on his fitness for public
station. There is ... no doubt[, however,] that the publicly-aired
opinions on both sides of the dispute over article VI placed no stock
in this proposition."4  For example, Federalists seem to have defend-
ed the clause on grounds of political practicality, even though many
Federalists believed that there are good men of every religion. Take
the following quote from Ellsworth, for example:
[I] t will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather suffer an inju-
ry, than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences. If we mean to
have those appointed to public offices, who are sincere friends to reli-
gion, we, the people who appoint them, must take care to choose such
characters .... .
38 Note, supra note 5, at 1653 (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestab-
lishment at the Founding, Part : Establishment of Religion, 44WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2178
(2003)).
39 [d.
40 John Sullivan, Letter to Jeremy Belknap on Feb. 26, 1788, in CHARLES E.L. WINGATE, LIFE
AND LETTERS OF PAINE WINGATE 220-21 (1930).
41 Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of Selected Nine-
teenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in the United States
Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 950 (1996) (quoting 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 131, 385-386 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1859)).
42 Bradley, supra note 17, at 697.
43 See, e.g., THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 6, at 208 (Influen-
tial Federalist Richard Dobbs Spaight stated: "Every man has a right to worship the Su-
preme Being in the manner he thinks proper. No test is required. All men of equal ca-
pacity and integrity, are equally eligible to offices."); see also PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES
OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA, CONVENED AT HILLSBOROUGH, ON MONDAY
THE 21ST DAY OF JULY, 1788, FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELIBERATING AND DETERMINING ON
THE CONSTITUTION RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, THE
17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1787, at 223-35 (1789) (James Iredell, Sr. and Spaight were par-
ticularly eloquent on this point in North Carolina, as were Federalist ministers in the
Massachusetts Convention. In the Massachusetts and North Carolina ratifying conven-
tions, Federalists took a strong, principled stand to the effect that a religious test was
wrong, and that there are just people in all religions).
44 AN ORIGINALIST ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 1654 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth, The Letters of a
Landholder, THE CONN. COURANT, Dec. 17, 1787, at 170).
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Instead of a religious test, Ellsworth proposed that the entrustment of
the office or public trust come simply from "securi[ing] the confi-
dence" of the - very religious - public." In the end, of course, the No
Religious Test Clause was included in the final version of Article VI.
Post-ratification, the No Religious Test Clause "initiated a liberal-
izing trend in the states" and many began to abandon religious tests.4
Though initially a minority position, the federal ban on religious tests
"contributed to a growing public perception that religious test oaths
had no place in republican governments."4 7 This liberalization, how-
ever, did not shed light upon the meaning of the term "public Trust"
to which a religious test may not apply under the text of Article VI,
clause 3.
C. Interpretational Foundations
While there is little existing scholarship examining the No Reli-
gious Test Clause, there is even less which examines the "public
Trust" phrase within the clause." Most authors assume without exam-
ination that "public Trust" ought to be conflated with "office."4 9 But
such a reading is unsupported by "canons of construction [which]
ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given sep-
arate meanings."5o Because the No Religious Test Clause separates
"Office" and "public Trust" with the disjunctive "or," the terms should
be given separate meanings (just as the Supreme Court has given the
"states or the people" different meanings under the Tenth Amend-
45 AN ORIGINALISTANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 1654.
46 Dreisbach, supra note 23, at 272 (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 273.
48 Seth Barrett Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text: The Argumentfor a "New" Inter-
pretation of the Incompatibility Clause, the Removal & Disqualification Clause, and the Religious
Test Clause-A Response to Professor Josh Chafetz's Impeachment & Assassination, 61 CLEv. ST.
L. REv. 285, 348-50 (2013) [hereinafter Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text]
(identifying a myriad of sources); see also Benjamin Cassady, "You've Got Your Crook, I've
Got Mine": Why the Disqualification Clause Doesn't (Always) Disqualify, 32 QUINNIPIAc L. REV.
209 (2014); Seth Barrett Tillman, Originalism and the Scope of the Constitution's Disqualifica-
tion Clause, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 59 (2014). Much of Volumes 32 and 33 of the Quin-
nipiac Law Review, as well as Professor Tillman's work, is dedicated to related constitu-
tional law questions. Professor Tillman also pointed out to me that many law review
articles and books have employed a typo to use the term "Office of [sic] public Trust"
49 Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text, supra 48, at 348-50 (identifying a myriad of
sources).
50 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); see also United States v. Sprague, 282
U.S. 716, 733 (1931) (construing the Tenth Amendment as reserving un-enumerated
powers to the states "or" the people).
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ment).s5 The No Religious Test Clause's "public trust" language may
be more expansive than the Clause's "officer" language, possibly ex-
tending to federal contractors, grantees of federal funds, broadcast-
ing license holders,2 and federal elected officials.
It is axiomatic that constitutional interpretations begin with the
54
text itself and must consider the traditional usage of its terms.
Moreover, it is held by the Supreme Court that the Framers wrote the
Constitution to be understood by the "voters," and its "words and
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary ... meaning," not
"technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary cit-
izens in the founding generation."5 5 The ordinary meaning that was
"known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation" confirms
that "office" and "public Trust" should be given separate meanings.5
51 Sprague, 282 U.S. at 733; see also Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. CL 2384, 2389-90
(2014) (explaining that a federal bank fraud statute, which makes it a crime to obtain
bank property "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses" does not require proving that
the defendant intended to defraud the bank, because of the disjunctive "or" between
"false" and "fraudulent"); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978) (inter-
preting a statute authorizing the FCC. to impose sanctions on broadcasters who engage in
"obscene, indecent, or profane" broadcasting, and holding that the disjunctive "or" im-
plies that each word has a separate meaning).
52 MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
667-70 (2d ed. 1996) (suggesting that the Religious Test Clause's public trust language is
"broader" than the Clause's officer language and may extend to federal contractors,
grantees of federal funds, and holders of "broadcast license[s]").
53 Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11J.L. & RELIGION 355, 369
n.59 (1995) (arguing that political officials are protected by the No Religious Test Clause,
which may include federal civil servants). 5 U.S.C. § 2104 defines "officer," in part, as any
person "engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an
Executive act. . ." 5 U.S.C. § 2104 (2016). Additionally, 5 U.S.C. § 2105 states that "em-
ployee" under the government organization and employees chapter includes both "offic-
ers" and civil service appointees. 5 U.S.C. § 2105 (2016).
54 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77 (2008) ("In interpreting this text, we
are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished
from technical meaning.' Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning,
but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary
citizens in the founding generation.") (quoting Sprague, 282 U.S. at 731).
55 Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-77. While this is the Supreme Court's position, the Constitution
contains many terms of art with legal meanings outside of their substantive terms. And
although the public may recognize the physical form of such words, technical training is
required to fully understand their legal meanings.
56 See id. But see, DIRECTIONS TO THE ELECTORS OF THE ENSUING PARLIAMENT, WHICH IS TO
MEET ON TUESDAY THE 30TH OF DECEMBER, AGREEABLE TO THE LATE ADDRESSES PRESENTED
TO HIS MAJESTY 16 (London, 1702), available at Gale Eighteenth Century Collections
Online ("Men also who are unquiet in their Natures, and Litigious in their Practices,
ought to give more than ordinary Proofs of their Integrity, before their Electing into a
publick [sic] Trust can be justify'd.") (emphasis added) (noting that "office" and "publick
[sic] Trust" sometimes seemed to have similar meanings).
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Samuel Johnson's classic 1755 dictionary defines "public," when
used as an adjective, as "regarding not private interest, but the good
of the community.",7  Additionally, in 1755, the word "trust," when
used as a noun, meant, "confidence, reliance on another" and the
"State of him to whom something is entrusted."5  Therefore, under-
stood together, the phrase "public trust" likely meant, as understood
by the Founding Fathers, an entrustment of confidence and reliance
for a public or community interest.59
Significant contemporaneous ources support concluding that the
terms "public Trust" and "office" were not synonymous to the Consti-
tutional Framers. First, the Constitution itself distinguishes between
offices of trust and offices of profit in the context of emoluments,
impeachment, and presidential electors.0 Second, prominent litera-
ture of the day supports the conclusion that officers and public Trusts
57 SAMUELJOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1598 (1st ed. 1755). See gen-
erally Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Deter-
mine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 358 (2014).
58 JOHNSON, supra note 57, at 2106-07. Alternative definitions in Samuel Johnson's diction-
ary include: "charge received in confidence;" "confidence in supposed honesty;" and
"Deposit; something committed to charge of which an account must be given." Id. See at-
so JACOB GILES, A NEW LAw-DICTIONARY 746 (1739) ("Trust: is a Confidence which one
Man reposes in another; and if a Person in whom a Trust is reposed, breaks or doth not
perform the same, the Remedy is by Bill in Chancery, the Common Law generally taking
no Notice of Trusts."). In addition to developing concepts of the "public trust," the pub-
lic would likely have been familiar with the concept of equitable trusts, referenced in the
latter definition of "trust."
59 See, e.g., A HELP TO A NATIONAL REFORMATION. CONTAINING AN ABSTRACT OF THE PENAL-
LAWS AGAINST PROPHANENESS AND VICE 94 (5th ed. London,J. Downing 1720), available at
Gale Eighteenth Century Collections Online (collecting the oaths and rules for eight-
eenth century British officials). Magistrates took "an Oath, and publick Trust upon
[them] to execute the laws" in their service of the public. Id. See also An Act for Dividing
and Inclosing the Open Fields, Common Pastures, and other Commonable Places, in
Burton Overy, in the County of Leicester, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 61, at 7 (Eng.), available at
Gale Eighteenth Century Collections Online (listing churches, hospitals, and schools as
eighteenth century examples of "publick Trust[s]").
60 Offwers of the United States within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 2007 WL 1405459,
at *16 (U.SA.G. Apr. 16, 2007) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 8 ("No Tide of Nobility
shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign
State."); U.S. CONST. art. I § 3, cl. 7 ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not ex-
tend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Of-
fice of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nev-
ertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according
to Law."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sen-
ators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the Unit-
ed States, shall be appointed an Elector.")).
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are different. For instance, Blackstone distinguished "offices of pub-
lic trust" from "ministerial offices,"" or those in which "little or noth-
ing is left to the discretion of the officer[] ." In The Federalist, Alex-
ander Hamilton distinguished the terms: "If it be a public trust or
office in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority,
there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity."
The authors of The Federalist understood the phrase "public trust" to
mean not precisely the office itself, but an embodiment of a collec-
tion of intangible qualities: "blood and friendship,"4 "a personal in-
fluence among the people,"5 a "wisdom to discern and. . . virtue to
pursue the common good,"" "pride and consequence,""' "reputation
and prosperity.""
Finally, the No Religious Test Clause as we know it today differs in
one key respect from the clause Pinckney introduced to the Conven-
tion. The Convention more or less unanimously agreed to the follow-
ing language: "but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Quali-
fication to any Office or public Trust under the authority of the
United States."6  The Committee of Style removed the words "the au-
thority of," leaving "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qual-
ification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."70
The implication of this change is that, while "the authority of" was
considered superfluous and could be removed, "public Trust" dif-
fered from "office" more than just stylistically and should remain.
61 Officers of the United States within the Meaning of the Ap/)ointments Clause, 2007 WL 1405459,
at *16 (U.S.A.G. Apr. 16, 2007) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 36-37
(1771)).
62 Id. (quoting LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
448 (1948)).
63 See Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, The Great Divorce: The Current Understand-
ing of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility Clause, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 134,139 (2008) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) (emphasis added)).
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison).
65 Id.
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
67 THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison).
68 Id.
69 Rofes, supra note 43, at 12; Bradley, supra note 17, at 689 (noting that only North Caroli-
na voted against the clause).
70 Rofes, supra note 46, at 12.
71 Professor Seth Barrett Tillman recently explored the meaning of office, as opposed to
officer, and concluded the phrase was dropped for intentional reasons concerning differ-
ences in meaning of these two words, particularly as applied to emoluments-in other
words, profit, salary, or compensation. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Six Puzzles for Professor
AkhilAmar, Loy. U. Chi. L. School, Fourth Annual Const. L. Colloquium Conference Pa-
per 1-34 (Nov. 1, 2013); National U. of Ir. Maynooth Legal Studies Research Paper Series
No. 2013-17-03, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2173899,
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D. Fiduciary Underpinnings
Other literary sources concerning fiduciary duties shed light on
the original meaning of "public Trust." The fiduciary ideal reflected
in the phrase "public Trust" seems to have ranked "just below 'liberty'
and 'republicanism' as an element of the ideology of the day."" The
Constitutional Framers' imposition of fiduciary standards on gov-
ernment officials was neither accident nor "empty metaphor."" In
fact, " [r]ecent legal-historical work supports the view that the Framers
intended even noncriminal breaches of trust by public officials to be
remediable by impeachment and removal."74
Many of the original colonial charters were granted "upon Trust,"
and fiduciary language was a common component of state constitu-
tions by the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention." The royal
charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island, for instance, were issued
by Charles II to the respective colony governors "upon trust," for the
benefit of the governors, their contemporaries, and the future free-
men of the colony.76 Following the Declaration of Independence,
many states incorporated trust language into their state constitu-
tions. Some states used "trust" interchangeably with "office." For
instance, Delaware's constitution specified that state legislators were
to serve as justices of the peace "during their continuance in trust."7
http://works.bepress.com/seth-barretttillman/349/. For information about a parallel
clause in the Australian Constitution, see Luke Beck, Williams v. Commonwealth: School
Chaplains and the Religious Tests Clause of the Constitution, 38 MONASH U. L. REv. 271, 272
(2012); Luke Beck, The Constitutional Prohibition on Religious Tests, 35 MELB. U. L. REv. 323
(2011).
72 Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1077, 1086
(2004); see also Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and
the Fiduciary Norm against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 845, 873-75 (2013).
73 Kim, 98 CORNELL L. REV. at 874.
74 Id. at 873-75 (2013) (citing Natelson, supra note 72, at 1170-71).
75 Natelson, supra note 72, at 1086, 1134-36.
76 Id. at 1112 (2004) (citing Charter of Conn. (1662), available at
http://avalon.aw.yale.edu/17th-century/ctO3.asp; Charter of R.I. and Providence Plan-
tations (1663), available at avalon.law.yale.edu/17thcentury/riO4.asp; see also Ga. Charter
(1732), available at avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/gaO1.asp. Contrast the charters of
Virginia and Massachusetts, which contain no trust language. Natelson, supra note 72, at
1112 n.143 (citing First Charter of Va. (Apr. 6, 1606), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th-century/vaO1.asp; Second Charter of Va. (May 23,
1609), available at hhttp://avalon.1aw.yale.edu/17thcentury/va02.asp; Third Charter of
Va. (Mar. 12, 1612), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/vaO3.asp; First
Charter of Mass. (Mar. 4, 1629), available at avalon.law.yale.edu/17th-century/masso03.asp).
77 Natelson, supra note 72, at 1134-35 (detailing the various states' efforts incorporating the
public trust doctrine following independence).




However, other state constitutions, such as Maryland's, imposed more
explicit fiduciary duties on public officials:
That all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of gov-
ernment are the trustees of the public, and, as such, accountable for
their conduct; wherefore, whenever the ends of government are pervert-
ed, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of re-
dress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the
old or establish a new government.
There was virtually no disagreement that government agents were
instilled with fiduciary responsibilities: Federalists and Anti-
Federalists alike based their respective Constitutional arguments on
fiduciary principles."o This vision of government as trustee was ex-
pressly affirmed in The Federalist
* [T]he members of the legislative branch are connected to the public
by blood and friendship. The nature of their public trust implies .. . that
they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and
81
liberties of the people.
* [T]he aim of every political constitution is . .. first to obtain for rul-
ers men who possess the most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pur-
sue, the common good of society ... whilst they continue to hold their
82
public trust.
John Locke also characterized government officials as holders of a
trust, with the people as beneficiaries." Locke believed that a gov-
ernment is dissolved when a legislature, as representative of the peo-
ple, acts "contrary to [its] trust" :84
The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their prop-
erty; and the end why they chuse [sic] and authorize a legislative is, that
there may be laws made . . . as guards and fences to the properties of all
the members of the society . .. whenever the legislators endeavor to take
away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slav-
79 Id. at 1135 (citing Md. Const. of 1776, art. IV, available at http:// www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/ma02.htrn).
80 Id. at 1083-35 (2004) (examining the common agreement even among political rivals
during the founding era that government has a fiduciary responsibility to its citizenry).
81 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
82 THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madi-
son) ("[a sense of national character] . . .can only be found in a number so small that a
sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each
individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with the public trust, that the pride and
consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and pros-
perity of the community.").
83 Robert G. Natelson, The Constitutional Contributions ofjohn Dickinson, 108 PENN ST. L. REV.
415, 432 (2003).
84 John Locke, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
166 (Ian Shapiro ed.) (2003).
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ery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the
people . . . . By this breach of trust, [the legislators] forfeit the power the
people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves
to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty.
Locke posited that the executive holds a "double trust ... both to
have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the
law ... [and that he] acts against both, when he goes about to set up
his own arbitrary will as the law of society."" Locke utilized the trust
analogy in the context of slavery ("[T]he liberty of man, in society, is
to be under no . . . dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but
that what the legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it ...
." ) and the source and extent of legislative power ("[T]hese are the
bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society . .. have set
to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of gov-
ernment. . . ." ).
In summary, the "public Trust"-a community's entrustment of
an entity to serve the public interest-was understood by the Found-
ing Fathers as a necessary duty of a republican government. Con-
temporaneous sources also demonstrate that "public trust" and "of-
fice" were distinct terms." Before offering a complete definition of
the term to serve as a cornerstone for future jurisprudence, this Arti-
cle will now explore how the term has evolved in the modern era.
II. MODERN SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
As one might imagine, judicial interpretations of the No Religious
Test Clause are scarce. But there are some sources concerning public
interest law interpreting jurisprudential history that shed some light
on the Clause's original meaning and modern significance." This
85 Id. at 197.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 114.
88 Id. at 162.
89 This distinction between "offices" and "public trusts" is reflected in current government
hiring practices. By federal regulation, government positions of "high or moderate risk"
are designated "Public Trust positions." 5 C.F.R. § 731.106 (2014). Such positions typi-
cally demand a "significant degree of public trust" or "significant risk for causing damage
or realizing personal gain." Id. Federal sentencing guidelines permit judges to increase
the sentences of those convicted of abusing positions of public trust by two levels. See, e.g.,
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 ("If this adjustment is based upon an
abuse of a position of trust, it may be employed in addition to an adjustment under
§3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).").
90 AN ORIGINALIST ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 1660; Bradley, supra note 17, at 714 (stating
that except for one holding where there was no violation of the clause found, no particu-
lar case has rested upon the clause).
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Part begins with a discussion of the two legal entities private actors
most commonly use to try to benefit the public-judicially recognized
trusts and state-licensed non-profit corporations.9' This Part next an-
alyzes the only three distinct areas of public interest law (beyond
general fiduciary principles discussed in Part I above) in which the
term has been used with any regularity (and perhaps at all). Those
areas are (1) environmental regulation, (2) tax exemptions, and (3)
museum law. Each is discussed in turn below.
A. Judicially Recognized Trusts and Non-Profit Corporations
A trust is a property arrangement that assigns legal title to the
trust property to the trust manager or trustee while establishing the
right to benefit from the trust property to another person, group or
entity.9 2 The trustee manages the trust property in accordance with
the trust document.93 To be classified as a charitable trust, as op-
posed to a private trust, the trust must provide a social benefit to the
public. Unlike private trusts, a charitable trust receives preferential
91 The terms "non-profit" and "not-for-profit" are often used interchangeably to refer to
organizations bound by a "non-distribution constraint" (i.e., the organization's directors,
members, or officers may not earn a profit from the activities of the organization). Patty
Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations
of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 409, 412 (2003). The not-for-
profit corporation falls underneath the non-profit umbrella, which also encompasses "in-
dividual enterprises, partnerships, associations and foundations." H. H. OLECK,
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS 18-20 (5th ed. 1988).
The term "not-for-profit" is perhaps more accurate, as non-profit organizations may take
in a profit, but must use the profits to further the mission of the organization. Robert S.
Pasley, Organization and Operation of Non-Profit Corporations-Some General Considerations, 19
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 239, 241 (1970). This Article will use the term non-profit for the sake of
simplicity, as the distinction is insignificant to its analysis.
92 A. ScoTr ET AL., ScOT ANDASCHERON TRUSTS § 2.1.3 (5th ed. 2006).
93 E.g., Jennifer L. White, Note, Wen It's Ok to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Frame-
work for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1041, 1049 (1996).
94 E.g., id. (quoting Bogert's Trusts and Trustees (6th ed. 1987)). "The way American mu-
seums' educational and scientific purposes are understood has changed significantly over
time. Museums in the post-World War II era have been described as being in the 'salvage
and warehouse business.' Their goal was to gather, acquire, preserve and study the rec-
ord of human and natural history. In that sense, museums were certainly fulfilling an ed-
ucational and scientific purpose by adding to the store of human knowledge about a wide
range of subjects, including the history of human civilization, broader definitions of life,
and the natural sciences. However, understanding of this educational purpose has shift-
ed significantly. Most museums now view their educational mission to be one of interpre-
tation and presentation, not just to a narrow scholarly community or to those already ac-
customed to visiting museums, but to the neighborhood community and the public at
large. As such, museums have been forced to reach out into the community and to be-
come part of it through novel exhibits that are not always focused on the presentation of
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tax treatment in recognition of the public service it provides." A
non-profit corporation also receives tax benefits in exchange for
providing social or public benefits." However, it is managed by an
elected board of directors, under the supervision of the state's attor-
ney general and in accordance with the corporation's charter and by-
laws.97
While the terms of the trust document or non-profit charter dic-
tate the management of the trust or non-profit, the trustee or direc-
tor is also bound by certain fiduciary duties-generally speaking, the
duty of loyalty ("to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries".) and the duty of care (to exercise "care and dili-
gence""). Notably, while the fiduciary duties of a trustee and a direc-
tor "do not differ in kind[,] ... the trustee is [often] expected to sat-
isfy a higher standard with respect to both duties."' For instance,
while the duty of loyalty prohibits a trustee from conducting any
transaction between himself and the organization ("self dealing"),
whether or not it is in the interest of the trust, corporate directors are
only prohibited from such a transaction if it is not in the organiza-
tion's best interest.'o' In sum, fiduciary obligations comprise the
foundation of public trusts and provide theoretical underpinnings for
the other areas of law discussed below.
objects. This evolving understanding of the mission of museums as educational institu-
tions raises new questions as to the interpretation of whether and how museums are ful-
filling their educational purpose." Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 414 (internal citations
omitted).
95 White, supra note 93, at 1049.
96 Id. at 1049-50.
97 Id. at 1050.
98 Id. at 1052 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007)).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1051. For a thorough explanation of the disparate fiduciary standards between trus-
tees and business corporate directors, see Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 419.
101 White, supra note 93, at 1052 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007)); see
also S. COTTER, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 167 (1756) (The law of equity in England used to
require that tutors appointed to administer the estates of infants take an oath to see that
the heir was well raised, "his Estate be safely kept," and that the minor's affairs be admin-
istered solely "for the Profit and Benefit of the Infant." Trust administrators and execu-
tors of wills had to take similar oaths, swearing to only act for the "Profit and Benefit" of




In the context of environmental law, the public trust doctrine
maintains that certain natural resources are to be held "in trust to be
protected by the sovereign ... for future generations.,
1 o2
[T]he doctrine can be viewed as an inherent limitation on the sovereign
power to convert public resources into private property. The underlying
principle is that certain natural resources are of such fundamental value,
as the common heritage of humankind, that special and immutable stew-
ardship responsibilities are incumbent even on national governments. os
As discussed below, certain environmental resources are held in a
modern day "public trust," but the doctrine concerning natural re-
sources has long roots.
1. Historical Origins of the Environmental "Public Trust Doctrine"
The environmental public trust doctrine's roots have been said to
stretch back to the time of the Justinian Codeo. The scholars who
codified classical Roman law in the sixth century under Justinian's
commission found that: "By natural law, these things are common
property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it the shores of
the sea.,1 05 This expression of the public trust principle seems to have
been adopted into the legal code and customs throughout Europe
during the Middle Ages.0 6
A "reluctance" to allow private acquisition of certain natural re-
sources is widespread among human civilizations.'o' The public in-
terest doctrine thrived in North America even before European set-
tlers arrived, as "most American Indian cultures wholly denied the
102 Courtney Lords, Protection of Public Trust Assets: Trustees' Duty of Loyalty in the Context of
Modern American Politics, 23J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 519, 523 (2008).
103 Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for
Augmenting StreamJows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 33 (1996).
104 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 632 (1986).
105 Id. at 633-34 (quotingJ. INST. 2.1.1).
106 Id. at 634. Some scholars, however, question whether Justinian's Institutes truly serve as
the basis for the modem environmental public trust doctrine. See e.g., James L. Huffman,
Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 1, 3 (2007) (citingJoseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 474 (1970)) (arguing that recent en-
couragement of judicial intervention in natural resource management marked the be-
ginning of the modern concept of the environmental public trust doctrine).
107 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19
ENVTL. L. 425, 428-30 (1989).
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possibility of ownership of land, air, and water."'08 Going forward in
early U.S. history, the doctrine played "a central role ... in public law
and policy," particularly as it related to waterways.'09 One of the earli-
est actions of the First United States Congress was to reenact the
Northwest Ordinance, which provided that the "navigable waters
leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence [rivers], and the carry-
ing places between the same, shall be common highways and forever
free, as ... to ... the citizens of the United States . .. without any tax,
impost, or duty therefor.""o
Early American courts adopted the divisions of water rights first
expressed in Lord Chief Justice Hale's key English treatise, De Jure
Maris: (1) jus publicum (the rights of the public), (2) jus regium (the
state's right to use land for health and welfare), and (3) jus privatum
(the right to hold private title)."' The U.S. Supreme Court first fully
delineated the parameters of the environmental public trust doctrine
in 1892 in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois."2 In that case, the Court
was asked to settle the ownership of submerged lands extending out
from Chicago under Lake Michigan."3  In 1869, the Illinois legisla-
ture passed an act which gave the Illinois Central Railroad Company
the right to use and develop the land."4 However, in 1873 the state
repealed the act."0 When the railroad company continued to develop
the land, the Illinois Attorney General filed suit against it.'
The Court found for the state of Illinois, holding that the rights
granted by the statute were revocable."'7  The Court acknowledged
that the state of Illinois held the title to the lands under the water of
Lake Michigan, and that, in general, title carries with it freedom of
108 Id. at 430 ("Tecumseh, the Shawnee Chief, asked rhetorically, 'Sell the earth? Why not
sell the air, the clouds, the great sea?'").
109 Id. at 436.
110 Id.
Ill Lazarus, supra note 104, at 636; see, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1894).
112 See Ill. Cent. RR. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The "public trust" language was first
used in Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 368 (1842). Martin spawned a line of
similar cases which was incorporated into and expanded upon in the Illinois Central deci-
sion, which restricted the government from making corrupt gifts to private interests. See
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); see also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876);
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855).
113 See Ill. Cent. RR., 146 U.S. at 433.
114 See id. at 448-49.
115 See id. at 449.
116 See id. at 433. For an in-depth look at the background of this complex case, see Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 799 (2004).
117 See lll. Cent. R.R, 146 U.S. at 452-53.
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alienation."' But the title the state holds in public lands is "different
in character . . . [because] it is a title held in trust for the people of
the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have the liberty of fishing therein.""9 The
state may grant parcels of the property in this public trust for the
construction of "wharves, piers, and docks" to the extent that the
structures improve the people's interest in the land.120 But, the Court
observed, this is "a very different doctrine from the one which would
sanction the abdication of the general control of the state over
lands."'2 ' It held that "the state can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested . .. than it can ab-
dicate its police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace." In other words, the state may grant con-
trol of the trust to a private organization in order to improve the
land, because private organizations may be in a better position than
the state to effectuate that improvement.'2  But any such improve-
ments must be for the benefit of the people, who are the beneficiar-
ies of the land.'2 4 Such grants to private organizations are "necessarily
revocable," and "the power to resume the trust whenever the state
judges think best is . .. incontrovertible."25
The Court extended the public trust doctrine to wildlife in 1896
in Geer v. Connecticut. In that case, the defendant lawfully killed a
variety of game birds, but was charged with possessing the birds with
intent to transport them outside the state in violation of a Connecti-
cut statute.2  The Court traced the history of the law related to wild
animals and concluded that "by the law of nature, every man, from
the prince to the peasant, has an equal [right] of pursuing and taking
to his own use all such creatures as are ferae nature . . . [.]"1 28 The state
may enact "positive laws" to harness this right for the benefit of the
community.'2 This power results from the "common ownership" of
118 See id. at 452.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 455.
121 Id. at 452.
122 Id. at 453.
123 See Ill. Cent. RB., 146 U.S. at 455.
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 See 161 U.S. 519, 522 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (over-
ruling Geerto extent that Greer held that state ownership of game and fish permitted states
to defeat interstate commerce clause challenges to state regulation of wildlife)
127 See Geer 161 U.S. at 521.
128 Id. at 527.
129 Id.
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the people and is to be exercised "as a trust for the benefit of the
people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government
as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as
distinguished from the public good." 3
While the state may regulate and grant rights to natural resources,
such grants must be qualified to "subserve the public welfare."'"' The
legislature has the responsibility to enact laws to protect the trust and
il 131secure its beneficial use in the future" to the people of the state.
But whatever rights are granted by the state to effectuate the trust,
"the question of individual enjoyment is one of public policy and not of
private right."' 3  The corpus of the public trust "can only become the
subject of ownership in a qualified way, and ... can never be the ob-
ject of commerce except with the consent of the state, and subject to
the conditions which it may deem best to impose for the public
good."'"
Although the "state ownership" fiction enunciated in Geer was
overruled in 1979 in Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Hughes court left Geer's
public trust doctrine intact, stating, "[T]he general rule we adopt in
this case makes ample allowance for preserving . .. the legitimate
state concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals under-
lying the 19th-century legal fiction of state ownership."' 5 Even after
Hughes, Geer still imposes "unequivocal" fiduciary duties on the
state.3 1
2. Modern Development of the Public Trust Doctrine
The seminal work on the public trust doctrine is The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, by Jo-
seph L. Sax. Professor Sax noted that recent decades have seen a
"proliferation of lawsuits" in which citizens sue to enforce environ-
mental regulations.'13 In outlining the public trust doctrine, Profes-
130 Id. at 529.
131 Id. at 533.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
134 Id. at 535.
135 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335--36 (1979).
136 Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35
LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 40 (2000).
137 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 473 (1970). "Of all the concepts known to American law, only
the public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might
make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a compre-
hensive legal approach to resource management problems." Id. at 474. The environ-
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sor Sax observed that it has no clearly defined parameters." There is
no blanket prohibition against the state conveying public lands to
private entities, for instance." Although courts disfavor such grants,
public trust doctrine cases do not require a "niggling preservation of
every inch of public trust property against any change."'" Still, public
trust doctrine jurisprudence reveals this unifying principal: "a court
will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental con-
duct which is calculated either to relocate that resource to more re-
stricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private
parties."4 1 Indeed, Professor Sax argued that the public trust doc-
trine is useful "whenever governmental regulation comes into ques-
tion," and, although historically the public trust doctrine was focused
on waterways, the modem doctrine is an efficient tool for managing
air pollution, pesticides, strip mining, and wetland filling, among
others.4 2
In recent decades, the doctrine has gained prominence as a
method of enforcing public rights in natural resources.'4 3 Though in-
itially a common law doctrine, many states recognize the doctrine ex-
plicitly by constitution or statute.'4' On a federal level, the doctrine is
codified in a constellation of statutes and regulations promulgated by
agencies tasked with protecting the environment.4 As discussed
mental public trust concept is "enjoying a moment in the sun as a reasonable organiza-
tional template somewhere between the inefficiencies of government bureaucracy and
the rapaciousness of global capitalism." Sally K Fairfax & Andrea Issod, Trust Principles as
A Toolfor Grazing Reform: Learning from Four Slate Cases, 33 ENVTl. L. 341, 344 (2003).
138 See generally Sax, supra note 137, at 486-88.
139 See id at 488 (noting that courts have permitted the transfer of some portions of the pub-
lic trust into private ownership).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 490.
142 Id. at 556-57.
143 See id. at 474.
144 "Almost all states, through constitutions and judicial opinions, require government man-
agement of natural resources for the benefit of the public. In so doing, many states have
imposed upon the government an implied or express duty of loyalty in the management
of the public trust." Lords, supra note 102, at 525-26. For detailed comparisons among a
variety of state statutory schemes, see Nelea A. Absher, Constitutional Law and the Environ-
ment: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, 59 TUL. L. REV.
1557 (1985); Horner, supra note 136, at 58-65; Sax, supra note 137, at 548-51.
145 Horner, supra note 136, at 25 n.5 ("See, especially, the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); the Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control
Act) 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994 & Supp. III 1997); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370f (1994 & Supp. I 1997); Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (PPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 13101-13109; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6y
(1994); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1994); Surface Mining
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above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the state is
the trustee of environmental resources, which are held in trust for
the benefit of the public.'4 ' Though governmental agencies routinely
grant environmental management contracts to private organizations,
thereby changing the trustee of these resources, the public benefi-
ciary does not change.4 1
Lower courts have had opportunity to apply the doctrine. For ex-
ample, the United States Court of Claims has stated that
"[t]ransactions relating to the expenditure of public funds require
the highest degree of public trust . . . . It has also determined that
the government agency grants for construction of certain public
works projects created a "public trust." 4 9 After Hughes, in 1980, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reaffirmed that
"under the public trust doctrine, the [states] and the United States
have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's in-
terest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from
ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people."5 o
In 1981, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
that when the federal government or the State conveys public trust
property to a private individual, that individual takes subject to the
terms of the trust-" [t] he trust is of such a nature that it can be held
only by the sovereign, and can only be destroyed by the destruction of
the sovereign."'5'
Since Geer, the public trust doctrine has expanded beyond water
and wildlife to incorporate beaches, parks, and even a historic battle-
field into the corpus of the trust, "evinci[ing] even greater confirma-
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp.
11 1997) (amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965))").
146 See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 521 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); McCready v. Vir-
ginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855); Martin v. Waddell's Les-
see, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
147 See, e.g., Town of Fallsburg v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 633 (1991).
148 Refine Constr. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 56, 63 (1987).
149 Id.
150 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); see also Gary D. Meyers, Var-
iation on A Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19
ENVTL. L. 723, 730 (1989).
151 United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F.Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981). Contra Sierra
Club v. Andrus, 487 F.Supp. 443, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("To the extent that plaintiffs ar-
gument advances the proposition that defendants are charged with 'trust' duties distin-
guishable from their statutory duties, the Court disagrees. Rather, the Court views the
statutory duties previously discussed as comprising all the responsibilities which defend-
ants [National Park Service] must faithfully discharge.").
1448 [Vol. 18:5
THE "PUBLIC TRUST"
tion of the modern public trust thesis.""2  This expansion of the
properties subject to fiduciary management has been codified by
most states and the federal government.5 As the trustee of our natu-
ral resources, the government is accountable to the public for its
management of those natural resources.15 4  While the government
can and does contract with private entities to perform work that the
government itself is responsible to do, those private organizations
merely become trustees of the natural resource corpus. Indeed, the
Federal Acquisition Regulations, which govern all federal acquisitions
of goods and services, state that the "expenditure of public funds re-
quire [s] the highest degree of public trust."'56 Thus, though private
organizations that contract with the government to perform tradi-
tionally governmental functions are not office holders, they are hold-
ers of a "public Trust," which may implicate Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution.
3. Conclusion
The public trust doctrine is likely to play a key role in environ-
mental law jurisprudence, but it also could expand to other delega-
tions from government to private entities to manage properties in the
public trust. As stated by Professor Sax, "[o]f all the concepts known
to American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the
breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool
of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehen-
sive legal approach to resource management problems."'5  In envi-
ronmental law, the environmental public trust concept is "enjoying a
moment in the sun," which many environmentalists view as a "rea-
sonable organizational template somewhere between the inefficien-
cies of government bureaucracy and the rapaciousness of global capi-
talism."5 5 Though the origins of the environmental public trust
doctrine in Roman law pre-exist the Anglo-American concept of the
environmental public trust, the modern adaptation has been a devel-
152 Lazarus, supra note 104, at 649.
153 Sax, supra note 137, at 558-66; Horner, supra note 136, at 25 n.5 (2000); Mary Christina
Wood, Nature's Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental Discourse, 25 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 243, 262
(2007).
154 Fairfax & Issod, supra note 137, at 344.
155 Town of Fallsburg v. United States, 22 C1. Ct. 633, 643-45 (1991); Refine Constr. Co. v.
United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 56, 63 (1987).
156 48 C.F.R § 3.101-1 (2014).
157 Sax, supra note 137, at 474.
158 Fairfax & Issod, supra note 137, at 344.
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opment of the past century rather than a deeply rooted concept in
the Anglo-American legal system.5 1
Given the growing prominence of the modern doctrine, it very
well may be the case that future public trust property delegations may
be subject to the No Religious Test Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
One could imagine in this era of governmental outsourcing property
being conveyed to and managed by a private entity while another en-
tity claims it lost out because of its status as a church or religious non-
profit organization.16 o One also can imagine the environmental pub-
lic trust doctrine expanding over many years beyond its environmen-
tal roots to other legal fields encompassing delegated public benefits
administration.
C. Tax Exemptions
This Part traces the history of charitable tax exemptions in the
United States and notes how public trust and fiduciary concepts have
influenced key statutes and case law in this area. It outlines how fu-
ture litigation and jurisprudence in the field could confront the No
Religious Test Clause in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.
1. Common Law Foundations
In enacting the first federal tax exemptions for non-profit organi-
zations in 1894, Congress was "guided by the common law of charita-
ble trusts."'6 ' The two cornerstones of this body of common law date
back quite far and are actually statutory in nature.
First, in 1279, Edward I enacted the first of two Statutes of Mort-
main, which prohibited private donations of land to the church.
These laws were based on the same principle as the rule against per-
petuities: because the church as an organization never "dies," any
159 Some scholars have recently argued that concepts of environmental public trust do not
predate the Constitution, but merely hearken to the Roman origins of environmental
public trust as a claim of legitimacy for the modern doctrine. See, e.g., Huffman, supra
note 106.
160 See Eang L. Ngov, Selling Land and Religion, 61 KAN. L. REv. 1 (2012). Standing would be a
hurdle for any such litigation to overcome. Cf Salazar v. Buono, 599 U.S. 700, 711 (2010)
(finding that the plaintiffs standing had been established by lower courts and had be-
come an unreviewable issue).
161 BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S, 574, 588 n.12 (1983).
162 Leonard Shelford, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Mortmain and Charitable Uses and Trusts,
26 (1842). Alienation of land "in mortmain" means to alienate land into "dead hands"




land transferred to it would be rendered unalienable in perpetuity.
Mortmain laws ensured that the land would remain within the king's
control.16 3
Second, in 1601, England enacted the Statute of Charitable Uses
Act.'64 While the Act did not create a tax benefit for charitable dona-
tions, it did repeal the mortmain statutes and provide a mechanism
for regulating charitable organizations and charitable gifts. 65
Throughout the years, courts attempting to define "charitable" (or
"charity") frequently have cited the preamble of the Act, which reads:
[S]ome""' for Relief of aged, impotent and poor People, some for
Maintenance of sick and maimed Soldiers and Mariners, Schools of
Learning, Free Schools, and Scholars in Universities, some for Re-
pair of Bridges, Ports, Havens, Causeways, Churches, Sea-Banks and
Highways, some for Education and Preferment of Orphans, some
for or towards Relief, Stock or Maintenance for Houses of Correc-
tion, some for Marriages of poor Maids, some for Supportation, Aid
and Help of young Tradesmen, Handicraftsmen and Persons de-
cayed, and others for Relief or Redemption of Prisoners or Captives,
and for Aid or Ease of any poor Inhabitants concerning Payments of
167
Fifteens, setting out of Soldiers and other Taxes.
Although easing the lives of the impoverished appears to be the
most unifying characteristic among the charitable causes recognized
by the Statute of Charitable Uses, the development of educational
and infrastructural projects is individually listed. A key English case
clarifies that poverty is not a necessary element to "charity" or suffi-
cient on its own to characterize "charity.""' In Jones v. Williams, the
English High Court of Chancery held that a bequest in trust to im-
prove a town's water works was for a public, and therefore charitable,
use.' 9 Charity was defined as "a gift to a general public use, which ex-
tends to the poor as well as to the rich.",o The British conceptions
carried over into the United States.
163 Lars G. Gustafsson, The Definition of "Charitable"for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Defrocking
the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental Assumptions, 33 HoUs. L. REv. 587, 603
(1996).
164 Statute of Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
165 Gustafsson, supra note 163, at 605.
166 The preamble of the Act begins by noting that the Queen and other "well disposed per-
sons" have, in the past, made charitable gifts that have been misused. The preamble then
lists the types of charitable gifts that have been made ("Some for relief of aged, impotent
and poor people," etc.). Statute of Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
167 Gustafsson, supra note 163, at 606 (quoting Statute of Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz.,
c. 4 (Eng.)).
168 Id. at 608.
169 Id. (citingJones v. Williams, 27 Eng. Rep. 422 (Ch. 1767) (emphasis added)).
170 Jones v. Williams, 27 Eng. Rep. 422 (Ch. 1767); see S. COTTER, A TREATISE OF EQuiTy 161
(1756) (showing that under English concepts of equity concerning public trusts, a "Cor-
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2. Charitable Tax Exemptions in America
American courts adopted these British principles of charitable
donations. In 1860, the Supreme Court of the United States quoted
Jones v. Williams with approval and held that charity is a "gift to a gen-
eral public use.""' In Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, the
Court noted that " [a] charitable use ... may be applied to almost any
thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social
man."7 2 State courts were also instrumental in developing this defini-
tion of the meaning of "charity." For example, in 1858, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court stated that a charitable use of property is one
for "promoting public works for the convenience or benefit of the
public."' 3  In 1867, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court de-
fined charity as "a gift ... for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under the influ-
ence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from dis-
ease ... by assisting them to establish themselves in life, by erecting
or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the
burdens of government."7 4 In sum, the common law of charitable
trusts developed by early American courts established that a charity
fundamentally was an entity that helped the general public by serving
a public interest to lessen the burden of government (yet governmen-
tally permissible acts would, of course, be limited by the Establish-
ment Clause).
In 1894, Congress passed an income tax statute known as the
"Wilson Tariff Act." 7' The purpose of the Act was to reduce tariff
rates and raise revenue for the government, which it did by imposing
a 2% income tax.77 The Act also contained the first charitable tax
exemption for "corporations, companies, or associations organized
and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purpos-
es." 7 The floor debate over the Act "leaves no doubt that Congress
deemed the specified organizations entitled to tax benefits because
they served desirable public purposes."17
poration" that administered a charity was a trustee for the charity and could only act to
benefit the charity, never to its detriment).
171 Gustafsson, supra note 163, at 610 (quoting Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 494 (1860)).
172 Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877).
173 Cresson's Appeal, 30 Pa. 437, 439 (1858).
174 Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867).
175 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 638-39 (1895).
176 Id.
177 BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 615 (1983) (quoting Ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat.
509, 556 (1894)).
178 Id. at 589 (citing 26 CONG. REC. 585-86 (1894)).
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The Wilson Tariff Act was deemed an unconstitutional "direct tax"
by the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust."' Howev-
er, in 1913 the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment enabled
Congress to once again collect income tax, and it promptly enacted
the Revenue Act of 1913."'0 Like the Wilson Tariff Act, the 1913 Act
exempted charitable non-profits."" Congress has included an exemp-
tion for charitable organizations in every subsequent income tax."
In doing so, it has continually reaffirmed the view that charitable de-
ductions are "based upon the theory that the Government is compen-
sated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public
funds. . .
In 1917, in discussing a provision similar to the modern I.R.C. §
501(c) (3) that evolved from the 1894 Act,1 84 Senator Hollis stated:
"For every dollar that a man contributes to these public charities, ed-
ucational, scientific, or otherwise, the public gets 100 percent.",1
The Internal Revenue Service has also applied this principle to chari-
table deductions on estate taxes, stating that "bequests for the benefit
and advantage of the general public are valid as charities."'16 The Su-
preme Court confirmed that the history of congressional tax exemp-
tions unmistakably reveals that the current charitable exemption, §
501 (c) (3), "depends on meeting certain common law standards of
charity-namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must
serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public poli-
,,187
cy.
In interpreting charitable tax exemption provisions, courts and
the IRS have "referred consistently to principles of charitable trust
law."'8 In 1924 in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, the Su-
179 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895); see abo id. at 638 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (holding that the in-
come tax imposed by the Wilson Tax Act violated Article I's prohibition against "direct
taxes").
180 John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 22
CuMB. L. REv. 521, 542 (1992).
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Bobjones Univ., 461 U.S. at 590 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938)).
184 The Supreme Court traces the history of the modem charitable tax exemption statute in
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 615-16 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Court notes that, from the Tariff Act of 1913 to the adoption of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the tax exemption was left essentially unchanged, except to expand upon
the types of organizations that could claim the exemption. Id.
185 Bobjones Univ., 461 U.S. at 590 (quoting 55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917)).
186 Id. at n.15 (quoting Sol. Op. 159, 111-1 C.B. 480 (1924)).
187 Id. at 586.
188 Id. at 597.
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preme Court noted that the purpose of the charitable exemption
from the income tax was "recognition of the benefit which the public
derives."' As recently as 1983 in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, the
Court stated that under the common law of charitable trusts, to reach
exemption status as a charity, an entity must be "in harmony with the
public interest" and not "at odds with the common ... conscience."'o
The Circuit Courts of Appeal have expanded upon Trinidad. For
instance, in 1964 the Second Circuit stated "we think it only fair to
determine a particular organization's right to [a tax] exemption
largely on the basis of the effect its operations have on the public.""
Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has re-
lied upon Trinidad's rationale and stated that the purpose of the char-
itable exemption has been to recognize that the exempted entity
"performs a public service and benefits the public or relieves it of a
burden which otherwise belongs to it."'"
The United States Tax Court also has had opportunities to apply
Trinidad in its decisions. Most recently, in 1982, the Tax Court held
that "it is the purpose of serving private interests which is prohibited
[in] an organization seeking qualification under § 501 (c) (3). The
fundamental reason for granting an organization tax exemption is
that it serves a public benefit."'93
3. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) and the First Amendment
Since § 501 (c) (3)'s evolution from the Act of 1894, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly been called upon to describe its purpose and
constitutionality in Establishment Clause cases.'9 4 As explained above,
to be eligible for tax-exempt status under § 501 (c) (3) an entity "must
serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public poli-
cy." 9 5 Legislative history, court rulings, and the common law of chari-
189 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).
190 Bob jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592.
191 People's Educ. Camp Soc'y v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 923, 932 (2d Cir. 1964).
192 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967).
193 Retired Teachers Legal Def. Fund v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 280, 286 (1982); see also, e.g.,
Coastal Club v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 783, 783, 805 (1965) (holding that a duck hunting club
was a private club and therefore did not qualify for an exemption under Trinidad); Peo-
ple's Educ. Camp Soc'y v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 756, 768, 772 (1963) (holding that an educa-
tional camp did not qualify for a tax exemption because its activities "were not directed
to, and did not result in, providing benefits either for the public at large, or for any
community as a whole").
194 E.g., Bob jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 587 n.10 (explaining that the meaning of § 501(c) (3) can
be traced back to 1894).
195 Id. at 586.
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ties support the conclusion that § 501 (c) (3) entities help the general
public by serving a public interest that the government would other-
wise perform.'" Religious organizations are often recipients of §
501(c) (3) exemptions."' While Americans differ in their opinions
concerning whether churches and religious organizations serve or fill
a public need, obviously the First Amendment's Establishment Clause
prohibits the U.S. from establishing a religion.'
Still, religious organizations have been at the heart of the Internal
Revenue Code tax-exemptions, which echo the purpose of the com-
mon law of charitable trusts. The Supreme Court has stated that the
exemptions are not granted as a result of the organizations' religious
efforts.'" Instead, religious organizations have been considered akin
to charities because of their secular activities.200 For instance, in rec-
ognizing the secular value of religious organizations, the Supreme
Court has noted that the benefits "derived from religious organiza-
tions [have] flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as
well." 0 ' In Texas Monthly v. Bullock, the Court stated that the reason it
has upheld tax exemptions provided religious organizations under
§ 501 (c) (3) is because the benefits are not "confined to religious or-
ganizations.,,0
These favored secular activities include not just such classically
recognized charity like feeding the poor, but also those activities that
" [benefit] the community's moral and intellectual diversity and en-
courag[e] private groups to undertake projects that advanced the
community's well-being and that would otherwise have to be funded
196 See id.; Harding Hosp., 505 F.2d at 1071 ("The exemption is conferred in recognition of
the benefit which the public derives from the activities of such organizations.").
197 E.g., Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 983
n.60 (1999).
198 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."). For some leading scholarship in the ar-
ea, see Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions about the Religion Clauses: Reflections on
Some Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131 (2010); Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause
Limits on Free Exercise Accommodations, W. VA. L. REv. 343 (2007); Marci A. Hamilton, A Re-
sponse to Professor Greenawalt, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535 (2009) (responding to critique of
Kent Greenawalt, GOD VERSUS THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAw (2005));
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exception Debate, 11 RUTGERSJ. L. & RELIG. 139 (2009);
Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding
of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1793 (2006); Douglas Laycock, "Non-
preferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875
(1986).
199 King, supra note 197, at 981-82, 1036-37.
200 Id.
201 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).
202 Id.
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by tax revenues or left undone."20 Not only do many religious organ-
izations help the poor, but they have been conceived of as also
providing the benefits of improving the community's intellectual and
moral development and strengthening diversity.204
There are many criticisms of tax policy subsidizing asymmetric, ad
hoc quasi-private ordering of societal benefits. For example, the
Court itself has noted "[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy
that affects non-qualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become 'indi-
rect and vicarious donors."'2 05 To paint with a bit of a broad brush,
this is largely considered constitutionally permissible under present
Establishment Clause jurisprudence so long as the government fairly
treats both religious groups and "nonsectarian groups" pursuing a le-
gitimate secular end.200 In contrast,
when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organiza-
tions . .. that either burdens non-beneficiaries markedly or cannot rea-
sonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the
free exercise of religion . .. it provides unjustifiable awards of assistance
to religious organizations and cannot but convey a message of endorse-
ment to slighted members of the community.
Also important to note, however, is that churches and religious
organizations also may be entitled to state tax income and property
tax exemptions under current law specifically because of their reli-
gious nature and that the Internal Revenue Code treats churches and
religious organizations somewhat differently from other non-profits
203 Id. at 12.
204 Id. at 13 n.3. The Court also has mentioned that constitutional tax exemptions apply
equally to "antitheological, atheistic, or agnostic" groups. Id. at 13.
205 Id. at 14 (quoting BobJones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591).
206 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14-15 ("Insofar as that subsidy is conferred upon a wide ar-
ray of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate
secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsi-
dy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause.").
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of the Establishment Clause, HUM. RTS. Spring
2001, at 16; Caroline M. Corbin, The Continuing Relevance of the Establishment Clause: A Re-
ply to Professor Richard C. Schragger, 89 TEx. L. REV. 125 (2010); Richard W. Garnett, Judicial
Enforcement of the Establishment Clause, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 273 (2008); Leslie C. Griffin,
Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23
(2010); Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REv. 1049 (2013); An-
drew Koppelman, Religious Establishment and Autonomy, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2008);
Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and Religious Exemptions,
77 TENN. L. REV. 351 (2010); Stephen B. Presser, Some Realism about Atheism: Responses to
THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 87 (1997) (reviewing ISAAC KRAMNICK
AND R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
CORRECTNESS (1996)); Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free
Exercise Clause, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985 (1986).
207 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 (internal quotations omitted).
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and trusts.208 Some differences in treatment are commonplace under
current law.5 *
4. Conclusion
The history and purpose of charitable trusts and modern tax ex-
emptions under I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) indicate that public trusts are enti-
ties designed to serve a public interest, as opposed to a private inter-
est, thereby (at least theoretically) alleviating the cost to the
208 In Texas Monthly, the Court considered a Texas statute that provided a state sales tax ex-
emption for publishers of religious periodicals. Id. at 5. Publishers of non-religious peri-
odicals contended that the statute violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 6. The Court
struck down the statute. Id. at 14. Compared to a New York property tax exemption,
which the Court upheld in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and
which did not single out "one particular church or religious group or even churches as
such," but rather "granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad
class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals,
libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups," the Texas
statute was too narrowly focused on religious organizations to pass Constitutional muster.
Id. at 12-14. The Court said: "How expansive the class of exempt organizations or activi-
ties must be to withstand constitutional assault depends upon the State's secular aim in
granting a tax exemption. If the State chose to subsidize, by means of a tax exemption,
all groups that contributed to the community's cultural, intellectual, and moral better-
ment, then the exemption for religious publications could be retained, provided that the
exemption swept as widely as the property tax exemption we upheld in Wahz. By contrast,
if Texas sought to promote reflection and discussion about questions of ultimate value
and the contours of a good or meaningful life, then a tax exemption would have to be
available to an extended range of associations whose publications were substantially de-
voted to such matters; the exemption could not be reserved for publications dealing sole-
ly with religious issues, let alone restricted to publications advocating rather than criticiz-
ing religious belief or activity, without signaling an endorsement of religion that is
offensive to the principles informing the Establishment Clause." Id. at 15-16. In his dis-
sent, Justice Scalia provides an exhaustive list of state sales and property tax exemptions.
Id. at 30-33, nn.1-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial
Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11
VA. TAx. REv. 71 (1991).
209 Additionally, tort immunity for charitable organizations is premised by some courts on
the "trust fund theory," which is the theory that a charity's funds are held in trust, either
expressly or impliedly, for the benefit of the public, and that to permit a tort claimant to
recover from these funds is impermissible because it would thwart the intent of the do-
nor. See, e.g., Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 121 (Md. 2001);
James v. Prince George's County, 418 A.2d 1173, 1185 (Md. 1980); Wood v. Abell, 300
A.2d 665, 678 (Md. 1973). As the Supreme Judicial Court of Maryland held in 1967,
"funds donated for charitable purposes are held in trust to be used exclusively for those
purposes, and ... to permit the invasion of these funds to satisfy tort claims would destroy
the sources of charitable support upon which the enterprise depends." Rhoda v.
Aroostook Gen. Hosp., 226 A.2d 530, 532 (Md. 1967). In recent decades, most but not all
states have abrogated the charitable immunity doctrine, rationalizing that most modern
charitable organizations are run like corporations and have the same access to liability in-
surance. Note, Charitable Immunity: A Diminishing Doctrine, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109,
117 (1966).
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government of providing certain services. Although religious organi-
zations are at the heart of tax exemptions in the United States, this is
primarily because of their secular contributions, not their religious
activities limited to their faithful members.1
Potentially, modem public trust theory in the tax field could con-
flict with Article VI's No Religious Test Clause. First, there is limited
contemporary scholarly support to concluding that a modern
501 (c) (3) entity, which fills charitable voids that otherwise would be
likely to burden the government, amounts to a "public trust." Profes-
sor Robert A. Destro briefly (in two paragraphs) contemplated that
non-profit entities receiving public funds could be "public trusts.""'
210 King, supra note 197, at 981-82; see also Citizens United v. FCC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Citi-
zens United is a non-profit conservative lobbying group that produced a film critical of
Hillary Clinton's candidacy for president. Id. at 319-20. The McCain-Feingold Act pro-
hibited Citizens United from broadcasting or advertising an "electioneering communica-
tion" within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary election. Id. at
320-21. Citizens United contended that this provision of the McCain-Feingold Act violat-
ed its First Amendment free speech rights. Id. at 330. In prior cases, the Court had held
that Congress may ban political speech based upon the speaker's corporate identity. Id.
at 319. However, in Citizens United, the Court overturned those prior rulings and held
that (1) political speech is a critical component of a healthy democracy, and (2) the value
of such speech is not diminished by the speaker's corporate status. Id. at 334-62. In Bur-
well v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Green family, owners of Hobby Lobby craft stores, objected
to the Affordable Care Act's requirement that Hobby Lobby's employment-based health
plans include contraceptive care. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765-67 (2014). The Green family be-
lieved that contraception use contradicts the Christian Biblical precepts under which it
operated Hobby Lobby stores, and that forcing Hobby Lobby to provide contraception
violated its rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id. Addition-
ally, Hobby Lobby argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which ap-
plies a strict-scrutiny test to any federal law that substantially burdens one's ability to prac-
tice his or her religion, invalidated the contraception mandate. Id. at 2767. The Court
held that Hobby Lobby could use RFRA to challenge the mandate because (1) other fed-
eral laws specifically include "corporations" in the definition of "persons," (2) the Court
had previously held that non-profit corporations could "exercise religion," and (3) there
is no logical basis for claiming that for-profit corporations cannot do what non-profit cor-
porations can do. Id. at 2768-70. Together, these cases stand for the idea that corpora-
tions operate in the constitutional realm much like individual people do, and thus have
the same or similar rights. However, on other occasions, the Court has held that a corpo-
ration's constitutional rights are not coextensive with those of natural persons. See, e.g.,
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) ("The right of a person under the Fifth
Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness.
It was never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might be in-
criminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person."). For a
compelling argument against the Supreme Court's holding that corporations are persons
that can exercise religion, see ZacharyJ. Phillipps, Non-Prophets: Why for-Profit, Secular Cor-
porations Cannot Exercise Religion Within the Meaning of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV.
ONLINE 39 (2014).
211 Robert A. Destro, Equal Treatment: Implications for Nonprofit Organizations, in EQUAL
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 101 (Stephen V. Mansma &J. Christo-
pher Soper, eds. 1998).
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Two additional scholars pondering the manner in which American
society provides care to child abuse victims via religiously affiliated
entities expressed the same thought in passing.1 They noted, "It is
unclear what standards a private, religious organization must meet in
fulfilling a public trust."1
Second, an alleged clash between the No Religious Test Clause
and modern non-profit tax treatment has been presented unsuccess-
fully in recent litigation, which could be expanded upon in future
cases. American Atheists, Inc. filed suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice.24 American Atheists alleged that 501 (c) (3) gives preferential
treatment to religious organizations over secular non-profits, because
religious organizations are not required to apply for tax-exempt sta-
tus or file an annual information return, and ministers' salaries are
tax exempt, among other things.215 American Atheists argued that
501 (c) (3) organizations constitute modern-day public trusts, and that
such preferential treatment violated the No Religious Test Clause by
effectively requiring a religious test in order to receive preferential
treatment under 501(c) (3).216 The court disagreed, holding without
extended analysis, that the clause does not "stretch [] to the lengths
suggested by the Atheists," and was unwilling to hold that the term
"public Trusts" under Article VI includes tax-exempt organizations
under 501(c) (3) based on "a basic reading of Art. VI, Cl. 3 and the
limited case law discussing [it]," rather than an analytical reading of
Article VI.2 1' However, the Supreme Court also held that interpreta-
tions of constitutional provisions that immediately follow their ratifi-
cation are critical to understanding a basic reading of constitutional
provisions and their terms as understood by the general public dur-
ing the time in which the provisions were ratified.2
212 Brian K. Gran and Laurel Caddie, Changing Boundaries: Child Abuse, Public Health, and
Separation of Church and State, 21 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2003) (discussing the
proper analysis for determining whether the Test Clause can direct public funds to reli-
gious organizations offering welfare services).
213 Id. at 30. They also noted, as is a common issue in sovereign and governmental immunity
in the outsourcing age, "[i]t is unclear as to when the activity of a private actor becomes
state action." Id. at 31; accord Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
531 U.S. 288 (2001) (determining whether a private entity has taken on the role of a state
actor); Lebron v. Nat'l Rail. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
214 American Atheists, Inc. v. Shulman, 21 F. Supp. 3d 856 (E.D. Ky. 2014).
215 Id. at 859-60.
216 Id. at 870-71.
217 Id. at 871.
218 See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008) (noting the critical importance, in constitu-
tional interpretation, of examining the "variety of legal and other sources to determine
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This Article suggests that entities organized under state charter
that receive federal tax benefits in exchange for providing a public
service actually could amount to modern day "public Trusts" within
the meaning of Article VI, and could therefore be subject to its pro-
hibitions of religious tests. But what if the religious test prohibition
conflicts with the non-profit organization's free exercise of its reli-
gion? This would pit the Free Exercise Clause and the No Religious
Test Clause against each other in a way that has not yet presented it-
self in the courts. Future jurisprudence analyzing this conflict could
center around principles raised by Hobby Lobby and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.
D. Museum Law
In the museum world, the final field utilizing the term "public
trust," the term is "a nebulous concept.""' The term is used often by
museum directors and employees and is starting to appear in the
body of cases seeking restitution of art and artifacts previously owned
by victims of war, conflict, colonialism, or theft.
For example, Glenn Lowry, director of the Museum of Modem
Art in New York, has explained that there is "'very little that defines
what constitutes acting within the public trust.'. ... '[I]n many ways it
is up to individual . . . museums to establish a relationship with the
public ... and then to act in a way that is consistent with their under-
standing of the museum. In this sense, the concept of public trust
must be seen as negotiable . . . ."'220 Some professional organizations
have attempted to define this public trust. The Association of Art
Museum Directors ("AAMD") Code of Ethics states that museums
"hold their collections in public trust," which implicates responsibility
to "institutional missions . . . trustees . . . and communities."2 2 ' The
the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification").
Post-ratification commentary presumptively shows the will of the people who voted on the
particular legislative provision and should receive weight in Constitutional interpretation.
219 Charles A. Goldstein & Yael Weitz, Claim by Museums ofPublic Trusteeship and Their Response
to Restitution Claims, 14 ART & ADVOCACY 1, 4 (Winter 2013); see also Allison Anna Tait,
Publicity Rules for Public Trusts, 33 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 421, 424 (2015) (proposing a
definition of "public trust" solely in the museum law context). Professor Tait and Profes-
sor Kreder communicated with one another as their articles progressed in the editing
process.
220 Goldstein & Weitz, supra note 219 (quoting Glenn D. Lowry, A Deontological Approach to Art
Museums and the Public Trust, in WHOSE MUSE? ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 129,
134-35 (James Cuno ed., 2004)).
221 Association of American Art Museum Directors, Code of Ethics, available at
https://aamd.org/about/code-of-ethics [hereinafter "AAMD Code of Ethics"].
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Association of Art Museum Curators' Professional Practices Guide in-
structs curators to recognize "that they hold positions of trust and
should act with uncompromising integrity."2 2 2
It seems firm, however, that part of this public trust concept con-
cerns educating the public. Again, the same Professional Practice
Guide provides that "[c]urators play a critical role in engaging the
public with art through the installation and interpretation of the
permanent collection . . . . In addition, curators provide information
and expertise on the collections and exhibitions to educators."2 2  The
International Council of Museums ("ICOM") provides the most ex-
plicit guidance:
Museums that maintain collections hold them in trust for the benefit of
society and its development.... Inherent in this public trust is the notion
of stewardship that includes rightful ownership, permanence, documen-
tation, accessibility and responsible disposal.... Museum collections are
224
held in public trust and may not be treated as a realizable asset.
Many museum professionals and some scholars have conceived
that the phrase "the public trust" encompasses a museum's purported
duty to responsibly collect, preserve, and display the world's art.
225 In
this context, the "public" is generally the community in which the
museum is located, and maintaining the trust is "a matter of main-
taining the museum's authority and trustworthiness ... and having
the proper means . . . to carry out [its] mission.226
Museum law is rooted in the laws governing charitable organiza-
tions. Whereas European museums are typically state-owned and op-
erated, American museums are commonly conceived of as "private
222 Association of Art Museum Curators, Professional Practices for Art Museum Curators, 6
(2007), available at http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/AAMC_ProfessionalPractices.pdf
[hereinafter "AAMC Code of Ethics"].
223 Id. at 12.
224 International Council of Museums, ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, 3, 5 (2004),
http://icom.museum/fileadmin/userupload/pdf/Codes/code-ethics2013_eng.pdf
[hereinafter ICOM Code of Ethics].
225 See, e.g., Sara Tam, Note, In Museums We Trust: Analyzing the Mission of Museums, Deacces-
sioning Policies, and the Public Trust, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 862 (2012); Glenn D. Low-
ry, A Deontological Approach to Art Museums and the Public Trust, in WHOSE MUSE?: ART
MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIc TRUST 129, 143 (James Cuno ed., 2004); AAMC Code of Ethics,
supra note 222, at 12 ("The curator has a fundamental role in ensuring that works of art
are properly conserved, stored, and exhibited .... Curators play a critical role in engag-
ing the public with art . . . ."); ICOM Code of Ethics, supra note 224, at 8 ("Museums have
an important duty to develop their educational role and attract wider audiences from the
community ... they serve. Interaction with the constituent community and promotion of
their heritage is an integral part of the educational role of the museum.").
226 Tam, supra note 225, at 862-63.
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institutions with a public role."m American museums are typically
2281
organized as either charitable trusts or non-profit corporations.
As discussed above, trustees are held to a higher fiduciary stand-
ard than corporate directors.2 Many courts apply the less stringent
"corporate director" standard to non-profit corporation directors .
This has a number of consequences nicely summarized in one fairly
recent article.
The societal interest in the beneficial administration of charitable organ-
izations requires the application of a more demanding fiduciary stand-
ard. Museums preserve an institution and collection of assets so highly
esteemed that they have been dedicated to public use and enjoyment.
Yet the general public, as compared with the shareholders of a for-profit
corporation, cannot monitor and control effectively the conduct of mu-
seum directors. The problem of collective action prevents any concerted
action; the costs of organizing the public as a whole are prohibitively
high, and individual members generally will not assume this responsibil-
ity or expense while others enjoy the benefits of their efforts without par-
ticipating. The presence of potential free riders generally will dissuade
members of the public from attempting individual action. As a result,
individuals will fail to take action that would serve the collective good-
they will hold out in the hopes that other individuals will bear the bur-
den. For this reason, one commentator suggests that "[i]f a board of di-
rectors has no membership to police its actions, enforcement of a trustee
standard would provide a necessary substitute."2 11
In addition to the typical fiduciary duties applicable in any corpo-
rate (including non-profit) context, museums often have responsibili-
ties to the donors of the museum's property.12 Donors, especially in
the past, placed restrictions on gifts that limit the museum's ability to
227 Id. at 855.
228 White, supra note 93, at 1048.
229 See supra Part H.A. Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts answered a
certified question from the Bankruptcy Court about the extent to which artworks given to
a dealer for consignment constitute a trust. Plumb v. Casey, 15 N.E.3d 700, 701 (Mass.
2014). In that case, a number of artists gave artworks to a dealer for consignment. Id. at
701-02. The dealer then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy (i.e. total liquidation, as op-
posed to restructuring). Id. The trustee of the bankruptcy estate argued that the art-
works given to the dealer for consignment were now the property of the bankruptcy es-
tate, and could be sold to pay off the dealer's debts. Id. at 702. The Supreme Judicial
Court determined that when an artist gives artwork to a dealer for consignment, the deal-
er holds the artwork in trust for the artist and therefore cannot be liquidated in bank-
ruptcy to satisfy the dealer's own debts. Id. at 706.
230 White, supra note 93, at 1048 (citing American Ctr. for Educ. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal. Rptr.
736, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) ("[A]ssets of charitable corporations are deemed to be im-
pressed with a charitable trust. . . ."); Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86,
89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) ("Assets of a charitable corporation are impressed with a trust.")).
231 White, supra note 93, at 1055.
232 Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 420-21.
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use or sell the property later."3 When restrictions over time become
"impractical, illegal or impossible to carry out," the museum must
seek relief through a cy pres action.2'" The cy pres doctrine "allows the
court to change the terms for the gift while remaining as close as pos-
sible to the donor's original charitable purpose. Courts generally
seem to grant requests to sell objects relatively freely."23 5
In sum, a museum's "public trust" is indeed nebulous. It appears
to be a theoretical mix of the undefined understanding that muse-
ums ought to use museum resources for public benefit; the duties
placed upon museum directors by their non-profit status, corporate
charter, or charitable trust document; fiduciary duties; and donor
expectations.
1. The Repatriation Debates & Cases
Compounding the nebulousness of the public trust concept in the
museum context is the controversial purpose to which the "public
trust" idea has been put in recent years: as a justification not to re-
patriate art and antiquities." Many museums have acquired objects
233 Donors may wish for their donated works to remain together as one collection, or to be
permanently in the recipient museum. See id. at 420. For example, Adelaide Milton de
Groot left her collection of Impressionist paintings to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in
her will, wherein she expressed a wish that the Met should give any artworks it did not
want to other specified museums. However, the Met was ultimately permitted to sell the
artworks when it was determined that her desire was not expressed in such a way as to
make it a legally-enforceable restriction. Id. at 421 n.58 (citing KARL E. MEYER, THE ART
MUSEUM: POWER, MONEY, ETHICS, 118 (Twentieth Century Fund, 1st ed. 1979)); see also
Bd. of Trs. of Museum of Am. Indian, Heye Found. v. Bd. of Trs. of Huntington Free Li-
brary & Reading Room, 610 N.Y.S.2d 488, 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("[W]hen it appears
that a particular purpose for which a charitable disposition has been made has ceased, or
that there is some other impediment rendering literal compliance with the terms of the
disposition impossible or impracticable, the proper course is not the summary termina-
tion of the disposition ... but an inquiry pursuant to . .. New York's statutory articulation
of cy pres and equitable deviation, to ascertain whether any general purpose of the dispo-
sition still admits of achievement by some alteration in the administration or application
of the disposition . . . .").
234 Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 421-22. ("Cy pres is an equitable doctrine that applies if
the terms of a charitable gift are found to have become impractical, illegal or impossible
to carry out and if the court determines that the donor had a general charitable intent.").
235 Id.
236 Goldstein & Weitz, supra note 219, at 4. Classic outlines of the repatriation debates are
found in John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 831, 845 (1986) and Paul Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 275, 283-84 (1982). Seminal works in the field include ROBERT EDSEL, THE
MONUMENTS MEN: ALLIED HEROES, NAZI THIEVES, AND THE GREATEST TREASURE HUNT IN
HISTORY (2009); HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL
THE WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 155-64 (1997); LYNN NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF
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which legally belong to someone else, or to which claims have been
made on moral grounds when legal grounds are insufficient.37  For
instance, the pillage of art during war is an unfortunate, widespread
problem.!s Even in times of peace, vulnerable archaeological sites,
churches and museums without significant security in place are loot-
ed with their wares trafficked onto the international market.23 9
When asked to repatriate art, some museums have claimed that to
do so-or, at least, to do so without a legal fight-violates their duty
to hold the art in their collections "in the public trust."a Citing this
conception of duty, museums have responded to claims by asserting
defenses such as statute of limitations. Of course, there can be little
EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD
WAR (1994);JONATHAN PETROPOLOUS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH 54 (1996).
237 See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 425 (2003).
238 See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultur-
al Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 245, 249 (2006) ("The
looting of art works has a long history, going back to Roman times and probably earlier.
In ancient times and in the Middle Ages, the taking of war booty was considered a normal
aspect of the conduct of war and often served as a means of compensating both soldiers
and military leaders.").
239 See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 236, at 831 (discussing how cultural property, a compo-
nent of human nature, end up across national borders); Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at
441 (discussing what kinds of restitutions have been granted for stolen artwork).
240 Goldstein & Weitz, supra note 219, at 4-5 ("[Take] [f]or example, the Four Cases discus-
sion[, which] refers to a case involving a claim by the heirs of Martha Nathan, a German
Jew who had been forced to flee Nazi Germany, in which the Detroit Institute of Arts
(DIA) initiated a declaratoryjudgment to defend its rights to the disputed picture based
on statute of limitations grounds. While this, in and of itself, is not notable, the explana-
tion provided by Graham Beal [Director of the Detroit Institute of Arts] as to why the
museum raised this defense is significant. According to Beal, the museum had concluded
that the sale of the painting had been legitimate, and not under Nazi duress. Nonethe-
less, the heirs 'declined to withdraw their claims.' As a result of 'these circumstances,' the
DIA determined that it had a 'fiduciary responsibility to protect the DIA's ownership [of
the painting], using all legal means available, including the statute of limitations and
laches.' As similarly expressed in the DIA's complaint, it was 'incumbent upon the DIA to
reject [the heirs'] claim and defend the City's rightful ownership of the Painting. . . .'
Most notably, the DIA explained that the museum had this obligation because of the mu-
seum's responsibility to act for the public, 'for whom it holds the Painting in public
trust.'") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
241 Sarah Favot, Ownership ofNazi-looted art 'Adam' and 'Eve' at Pasadena's Norton Simon Museum
disputed, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Jun. 25, 2014), http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/general-
news/20140625/ownership-of-nazi-looted-art-adam-and-eve-at-pasadenas-norton-simon-
museum-disputed (describing how Marei von Saher is attempting to reclaim a Lucas Cra-
nach the Elder diptych from the Norton Simon Museum in Pasadena, "Adam" and "Eve")
Ms. von Saher claims the diptych rightfully belongs to her because she is the heir of
Dutch art collector Jacques Goudstikker, who died while fleeing the Nazis and lost posses-
sion of the painting. The museum has stated that it will pursue all legal options, "con-
sistent with its fiduciary duties." Id. (emphasis added). Though the case has tied up the
courts for seven years with "technical" issues, it has yet to reach a hearing on the merits.
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argument that it is within the fiduciary responsibility of museum di-
rectors to assure themselves of the validity of a claim before settling.
But this author and others have maintained that objectively insuring
our venerated institutions do not traffic in stolen property is essential
to protecting the public's faith in these institutions.242
Nazi-era art restitution cases best exemplify the issue. During
World War II and the Holocaust, entire families were murdered.
Others were "cast to the winds, far from familiar languages, far from
family records, and often thrown into hostile new environments."2 4 3
Given this, and the fact that stringent post-World War II privacy poli-
cies mandated that many family and property records be sealed, Hol-
ocaust survivors were effectively "frozen out" from the records that
would have helped them discover their property.244 As a result, many
argue that raising technical defenses violates not only the public trust
but public policy.24 5 Some call to better prevent the problem at the
acquisition end.2  If a museum does not diligently investigate the
Id. Laches also has been asserted; laches is an equitable doctrine that disfavors those who
delay in instituting cases or neglect to prosecute them. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 142 (2014).
242 See Raymond J. Dowd, Nazi Looted Art and Cocaine: When Museum Directors Take It, Call the
Cops, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 529, 546 (2013) (suggesting that museums that "out-
smarted" families and got to keep their "ill-gotten gains" is problematic); Gerstenblith,
supra note 91, at 411;Jennifer A. Kreder, The Holocaust, Museum Ethics and Legalism, 18 S.
CAL. REV. OFL. &Soc.JuST. 1 (2008). But see SimonJ. Frankel & Ethan Forrest, Museums'
Initiation of Declaratory judgment Actions and Assertion of Statute of Limitations in Response to
Nazi-Era Restitution Claims-A Defense, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 279
(2013) (criticizing commentary that faulted museums for initiating declaratory judg-
ments seeking to quiet titie to the works and invoking statutes of limitations or laches de-
fenses, and saying that those commentaries ignore the complex nature of the claims as-
serted and the museums' fiduciary duties to protect the assets they hold in trust); Emily
A. Graefe, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums Possessing Nazi-Looted Art, 51 B.C. L. REV.
473 (2010) (discussing how museums must work under ethical guidelines when the claim
of alleged ownership is valid and how museums are not ethically obliged to work with the
heirs when the claim is invalid).
243 Dowd, supra note 242, at 546.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 545 ("Given the taxpayer subsidies of museum activities and the drain on the public
fisc created by this trafficking, I think the case for treating these stolen artworks more like
cocaine-a controlled substance, is compelling, particularly where, as here, museums
clearly knew better and have been actively engaged in falsifying the historical record.").
246 See Leila Amineddoleh, Protecting Cultural Heritage by Strictly Scrutinizing Museum Acquisi-
tions, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 729, 761-63 (2014) (noting that
there are no federal civil or criminal penalties for museums that acquire illicit art); Leila
Amineddoleh, The Role of Museums in the Trade of Black Market Cultural Property, 18 Art An-
tiquity & L. 227, 247 (2013) (arguing that because non-profit museums are given tax
benefits to provide a public service, "they should use these monetary resources for their
intended purpose-the public good. It is in the public's welfare for museums to properly
investigate their acquisitions"); Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 410; Jennifer A. Kreder,
The Revolution in U.S. Museums Concerning the Ethics of Acquiring Antiquities, 64 U. MIAMI L.
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provenance of the artwork it acquires, and later is forced to disgorge
itself of that artwork, it can certainly be said that the museum
"breach[ed] [its] public and fiduciary obligations."
In the late 1990s, the AAMD and the American Alliance of Muse-
ums ("AAM") (formerly the American Association of Museums) con-
vened a task force to make recommendations on the repatriation of
Nazi confiscated art.2 4" The recommendations of that task force led
to the foundation of the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art, signed by forty-four nations, which encourage muse-
ums to be proactive in restituting art confiscated by the Nazis." Cur-
rent AAM principles urge museum curators to thoroughly research
the provenance of artwork being considered for acquisition, to active-
ly seek to identify artwork in existing collections that may have been
unlawfully appropriated, and to "waive certain available defenses"
when appropriate to achieve an equitable resolution to unlawful ap-
propriations claims.2 o Similarly, ICOM has issued recommendations
encouraging museum professionals "to actively address the return of
REV. 997 (2010); Linda F. Pinkerton, Museums Can Do Better: Acquisitions Policies Concern-
ing Stolen and Illegally Exported Art, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 59 (1998) ("If the art market
is going to be cleaned up, that is to say freed of so much stolen and smuggled artwork, art
museums in the United States are going to have to abandon the back seat and take a lead-
ing role in the cleaning."); Victoria Reed, Due Diligence, Provenance Research, and the Acqui-
sition Process at the Museum ofFine Arts, Boston, 23 DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L.
363 (2013) ("[1]t is necessary for the MFA not to repeat the mistakes of our past. As we
strive for greater diligence today, these past acquisition mistakes in fact provide our
greatest learning tool."); Erin Thompson, Successes and Failures of Self-Regulatory Regimes
Governing Museum Holdings of Nazi-Looted Art and Looted Antiquities, 37 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS
379 (2014); The Int'l Council of Museums, ICOM Code of Professional Ethics for Museums §
3.2 (Nov. 4, 1986, amended July 6, 2001), http://icom.museum/ethics.html#3 ("Muse-
ums should recognise the destruction of human and natural environments and loss of
knowledge that results from the illicit servicing of the market place. The museum profes-
sional must warrant that it is highly unethical for a museum to support the illicit market
in any way, directly or indirectly. A museum should not acquire any object or specimen
by purchase, gift, loan, bequest or exchange unless the governing body and responsible
officer are satisfied that a valid title to it can be obtained. Every effort must be made to
ensure that it has not been illegally acquired in, or exported from, its country of origin or
any intermediate country in which it may have been owned legally (including the muse-
um's own country). Due diligence in this regard should establish the full history of the
item from discovery or production, before acquisition is considered.").
247 Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 453.
248 Association of Art Museum Directors, Resolutions of Claims for Nazi-Era Cultural Assets,
https://aamd.org/object-registry/resolution-of-claims-for-nazi-era-cultural-assets/more-
info (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
249 Commission for Looted Art in Europe, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated
Art (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.lootedartcommission.com/washington-principles.
250 American Alliance of Museums, Standards Regarding the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects
During the Nazi Era, http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-
practices/collections-stewardship/objects-during-the-nazi-era (l st visited Feb. 26, 2016).
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all objects of art that formerly belonged to Jewish owners or any other
owner, and that are now in the possession of museums, to their right-
ful owners or their heirs."2 1
Commentator Simon Frankel has argued that non-binding profes-
sional codes collectively call for "just and fair" solutions for all con-
stituents-including museums, which must be allowed to defend
themselves against non-meritorious claims.25' By refusing to allow ob-
jective review of the merits of claims to art on the basis of non-verified
statute of limitations or laches defenses, however, museums are not
preserving the public trust but "subverting" it.253 "[I] n fact, the oppo-
site is true: museums, archives and libraries gain standing, credibility
and competence when they confront the history of their collec-
tions."
At bottom, the ethics codes of most contemporary museum pro-
fessional associations now authorize waiving technical defenses
against Nazi-looted art claims and avoiding litigation in favor of alter-
native dispute resolution wherever possible. This "fact . . . stands in
opposition to the claim that the public trust imposes a 'fiduciary obli-
gation' to raise technical defenses where the museum has otherwise
determined that the claim lacks merit." 2 55 While these professional
guidelines "would not, of themselves, have the effect of pre-empting
the state common law fiduciary obligations [they] would seem to be
attempting to establish a standard by which to judge whether the
trustees and directors of museums are, in fact, fulfilling these obliga-
tions."
Future art repatriation cases filed against museums could deter-
mine what role the public trust theory will play in this field. Further,
as in many other fields, while compliance with industry standards
does not necessarily insulate one from liability, such standards can in-
251 Commission for Looted Art in Europe, ICOM Recommendations Concerning the Return of
Works ofArt Belonging tojewish Owners (Jan. 14, 1999),
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/OXSHQE36019.
252 Frankel & Forrest, supra note 242, at 297-98.
253 Goldstein & Weitz, supra note 219, at 7; Dowd, supra note 242, at 549-50 ("By retaining
property it knows to be stolen, by concealing provenance documentation, and by accus-
ing Holocaust victims, their kin and their lawyers of greed, the museum community has
actively advanced hurtful anti-Semitic stereotypes and has betrayed the public trust.").
254 Goldstein & Weitz, supra note 219, at 7.
255 Id.
256 Gerstenblith, supra note 91, at 444-45. See aso HELENJ. WECHSLER, ET AL. MUSEUM POLICY
AND PROCEDURES FOR NAzI-ERA ISSUES 87, 108 (2001) (App'x H, defining "[f]iduciary ob-
ligation" as "[t]he responsibility of a museum to the collections it holds in trust, for the
public").
1467May 2016]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
fluence the direction of tort law developments (even if ultimately via
influencing governmental regulation).m
2. Broader Deaccessioning Debates
The "public trust" concept also arises in the context of museum
deaccessioning practices unrelated to provenance (a/k/a chain of ti-
tle) problems such as prior theft. Cash-strapped museums may some-
times seek to sell part of their collections in order to remain finan-
cially solvent.2 58 The practice is completely counter to museum ethics
codes, but in dire circumstances deaccessioning may be the only al-
259ternative to shuttering the museum.
The AAM Code of Ethics states that it is unethical to deaccession
works of art for any purpose other than the advancement of the mu-
seum's mission.2'0 The AAM Code of Ethics, along with codes of eth-
ics of other museum professional organizations, was promulgated in
response to a 1972 scandal in which the Metropolitan Museum of Art
secretly sold donated works for cash.26 ' The American Alliance of
Museums and the American Association of Museum Directors
("AAMD") claim to want to curtail this practice because museums re-
ceive tax benefits in recognition of their mission to curate art for the
public's benefit. Deaccessioning purportedly thwarts this mission by
removing artworks from the public's access and placing them in pri-
262vate hands.
The AAMD permits museums to deaccession works that are re-
dundant, of poor quality, inauthentic, or of questionable prove-
nance. Museums are further urged to consider factors such as
whether the artwork might be sold to or exchanged with another ed-
ucational or cultural institution to keep the work in the public trust,
whether the artwork has a particular connection to the museum or
the geographical area, and, if the artist is still alive, whether to involve
257 See, e.g., Michael W. Richards, Tort Vision for the New Millennium: Strengthening News Indus-
try Standards as a Defense Tool in Lawsuits over Newsgathering Techniques, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 501 (2000).
258 Tam, supra note 225, at 851-52.
259 Id. at 852 (citing Reed Johnson, The Fresno Metropolitan Museum of Art & Science Closes its
Doors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at 1).
260 CURATORS COMMUTEE, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, A CODE OF ETHICS FOR
CURATORS, 1, 6 (2009), available at http://www.aam-us-org/docs/continuum/
curcomethics.pdf sfvrsn=0.
261 Tam, supra note 225, at 864-65.
262 See id. at 865--66.
263 ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., PROF'L PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS (Aug. 19, 2011), at 21-




him or her in the deaccessioning plan. Museums that deaccession
merely to fund operating costs or replenish endowment funds face
severe AAMD sanctions.265
The situation faced by New York's American Folk Art Museum in
2011 is instructive. The museum defaulted on a $32 million loan that
had financed the construction of an "impressive" new location.2 6 6 Ul-
timately, the Museum of Modern Art purchased the new building,
and the American Folk Museum returned to its more modest previ-
ous location. But the museum was forced to consider what to do with
its collection in the event of closure.6 Among the options was trans-
ferring the collection to the Smithsonian Institution. Such a transfer
would have required the approval of the New York State Attorney
General, who would have considered "whether the transfer would put
New York State residents at a disadvantage."6 Within the museum
world, such deaccessioning is viewed by most as a breach of the mu-
264 Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, ART MUSEUMS AND THE PRACTICE OF DEACESSIONING,
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/PositionPaperDeaccessioning%2011.07.
pdf; see alo, KARL E. MEYER, THE ART MUSEUM 180-92 (Twentieth Century Fund, 1st ed.
1979) (showing how deaccessioning or selling an artwork can have powerful implications
on a living artist). Museums' collection and exhibition practices can greatly influence an
artist's reputation and the value of his work. Art collectors, many of whom serve on mu-
seum boards of trustees, can harness the museum's power in this regard to inflate the
value of their personal art collections. Collector Robert Scull's art collection exploded in
value after the Metropolitan Museum of Art showcased his artwork and allowed Scull to
publish his views on art in its Bulletin. Id. Having been legitimized by the Met, Scull sold
his collection at a "circuslike" Sotheby's auction in 1973. Id. One piece, which Scull had
purchased from artist Robert Rauschenberg only 13 years earlier for $900, sold for
$90,000. Id. After the auction, Rauschenberg, angered by the fact that, in his view, he
had worked hard merely to make another man rich, approached Scull and hit him in the
stomach. Id.
265 See, e.g., Expert Witness Report of Michael Plummer, In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 13-53846), 2014 WL 4373988 (describing the effect of
AAMD sanctions levied against the Delaware Art Museum for such a sale).
266 Tam, supra note 225, at 850-52; Kate Taylor, Folk Art Museum Considen Closing, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/arts/design/american-folk-art-
museum-considers-final-options.html?_r=0.
267 Taylor, supra note 266.
268 Id. The attorney general in each state is tasked with protecting the public's interest in
non-profit organizations. One significant distinction between not-for-profit corporations
and for-profit corporations is that not-for-profit corporations lack shareholders. Share-
holders in for-profit corporations generally oversee management of the corporation and
can use their voting power to hold managers accountable. Because not-for-profit corpo-
rations do not have shareholders, the state's attorney general steps in to provide over-
sight. Additionally, members of the public do not have standing to bring an action
against non-profit organizations. Instead, they can bring the issue to the attention of the
attorney general, who can litigate against non-profit organizations that mismanage assets.
White, supra note 93, at 1044-45.
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seum's duty to the public,6 and the response to it ranges "from dis-
may to disgust."7
Recently, the Detroit Institute of Arts ("DIA") was under the na-
tional microscope, as Detroit's creditors targeted the museum's valu-
able collection as a potential source of revenue for the ailing city.
On July 18, 2013, the city of Detroit became the largest U.S. munici-
272pality to file for Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy protection. The
DIA, which opened in 1885, owns a collection that is valued anywhere
from $454 million to $8 billion.7 Creditors and city officials began
eyeing the collection as a ticket out of Detroit's crushing debts-
resulting in "a threat to [the DIA's] existence of a kind never con-
fronted by another American museum of its size."274
275Although a settlement was reached that spared the collection,
the briefing incidentally demonstrated how the theoretical analysis of
269 Tam, supra note 226, at 852 (citingJohnson, supra note 259, at 1).
270 Id.
271 Randy Kennedy, New Appraisal of Detroit Institute Art Collection Is Underway, N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2014), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/new-appraisal-of-detroit-
institute-art-collection-is-underway/?_php=true&type=blogs&partner=rss&emc=rss& r=0.
272 Complaint at 9, In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 13-
53846), 2014 WL 221575. Detroit's is also the largest ever municipal bankruptcy by dollar
amount (between $18 and $20 billion). Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in
Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-
bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all. Since the creation of the Bankruptcy Code in 1937,
640 government entities have filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection. Gosia Wozni-
acka, Stockton Bankruptcy is Hard Hit for City Retirees, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 27, 2012),
http://archive.today/Efyvl. After Detroit, the largest Chapter 9 bankruptcies have been
Jefferson County, Alabama's in 2011 (Mary Williams Walsh, A County in Alabama Strikes a
Bankruptcy Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/a-
county-in-alabama-strikes-a-bankruptcy-deal/), and Orange County, California's in 1994
(Floyd Norris, Orange County's Bankruptcy: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/08/business/orange-county-s-bankruptcy-the-
overview-orange-county-crisis-jolts-bond-market.html).
273 Christie's auction house estimated DIA's collection at between $454 million and $867
million. Kennedy, supra note 271. Artvest of New York appraised the collection on behalf
of the city and the museum and put its value at between $2.76 and $4.6 billion. However,
one of Detroit's largest creditors, the Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, hired Vic-
tor Weiner Associates ("VWA") to conduct an independent appraisal. VWA valued the
collection at $8.5 billion. This was set to become a highly contested issue in Detroit's
bankruptcy case, had it gone to trial. Michael H. Hodges, Report for Detroit Creditor Nearly
Doubles Value of DIA Collection at $8.5B, THE DETROIT NEwS July 28, 2014, at A5.
274 Randy Kennedy, A Bruegel, a Rembrandt, a van Gogh: Appraisal Puts Prices on the Priceless in
Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/arts/design/report-sets-values-on-detroit-institute-
artworks.html.





the existence of a public trust could differ depending on the specific
organizational structure of a particular museum.7 Unlike many oth-
er museums around the country, which most commonly today are in-
dependently-owned not-for-profit organizations, the DIA's real estate
and collection as of today is wholly owned by the city of Detroit,
whereas the museum operations are run by a separate non-profit en-
tity known as the Founders Society.2 7 The DIA was incorporated as a
278
non-profit charitable corporation in 1885. Initially, the city appro-
priated funds to support the museum and issued bonds to support
building construction.7 In 1915, however, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that these appropriations violated a state constitution re-
striction on "a city's lending of credit to an entity other than a public
or 'municipal agency."'280 In response, the state legislature enacted a
statute that permitted non-profit corporations to convey their proper-
ty to the city and required the city to use the property for the purpos-
es for which the non-profit corporation was organized.28 ' As a result,
the DIA transferred its buildings and art collection to the city to ena-
ble the city to support its mission.21 The non-profit corporation re-
mains in existence as the Founders Society.2 82
The museum's operations have changed a bit throughout the
284
years. Currently, the museum operates pursuant to a 1997 operat-
ing agreement, under which the city has legal title to the art collec-
tion and museum properties, but the Founders Society manages (and
285
entirely funds) operations. Some of the city's creditors argued that,
because the city had legal title to the collection and buildings, the
museum was a wholly municipal asset that ought to be sold to satisfy
debts.8 6 However, the 1997 operating agreement specifies that, while
276 Conveyance or Transfer of Detroit Institute of Arts Collection, Op. Mich. Att'y Gen., No.
7272, 10-12 (2013) [hereinafter "Michigan Attorney General Opinion"].
277 Michigan Attorney General Opinion, supra note 276, at 4.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 5.
281 Id.
282 Michigan Attorney General Opinion, supra note 276, at 6
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 CIY OF DETROIT & DETROIT INST. OF ARTS, OPERATING AGREEMENT FOR THE DETROIT
INSTITUTE OF ARTS 9-10, 12 (1997), http://www.scribd.com/doc/144896834/Detroit-
Institute-s-Operating-Agreement-with-City.
286 In March 2014, Detroit creditor Syncora served an "exhaustive" subpoena to the DIA in
its effort to force Detroit to liquidate the DIA's collection. The subpoena demanded that
the DIA produce, among other things, documents detailing its collection, annual finan-
cial performance, attendance figures, and artwork appraisals. Nathan Bomey, Bankruptcy
Creditor Hits DIA with Massive Subpoena for Artwork Records, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 29,
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the city retains legal title to the museum's artwork, the Founders So-
ciety is responsible for acquiring and disposing of art.2" The Michi-
gan Attorney General argued, therefore, that any city sale of the art-
work would "seriously undermine the ability of the Founders Society
to fulfill its contractual responsibilities." ,28 Additionally, the operat-
ing agreement between the DIA and the City of Detroit states that the
artwork is to be used to "benefit the community" and "stimulate in-
terest in art," not to pay off city creditors.'89 Furthermore, some of
the artwork is burdened with either permanent or temporary re-
strictions on alienation by the original donors.2 9 The Attorney Gen-
eral ultimately asserted that the city of Detroit holds the DIA collec-
tion in charitable trust for the benefit of the people of Michigan, and
therefore may not sell any piece in the collection to satisfy municipal
debts.2sI
While the Attorney General was correct in his conclusion that the
city may not, in general, sell artwork for a purpose contrary to the
museum's mission, he considerably overstated the case by asserting
that no piece in the collection may be sold.9 2 The Michigan Attorney
General based his opinion upon the museum's original authorizing
statute, 1885 P.A. 3, "Act for the formation of corporations for the
cultivation of art." While the Attorney General construed this statute
as having created a charitable trust, in fact it created a private non-
profit corporation ("The act provided that a group of individuals
could 'become a body corporate' for 'the purpose of founding a public
art institute' 'in the manner and for the purposes .. . set forth' in the
act.") ."93 In 1908, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the
Founders Society's transfer of ownership of the museum buildings to
2014, http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/Bankruptcy-creditor-hits-DIA-with-massive-
subpoena-for-artwork-records-a-481734.
287 Michigan Attorney General Opinion, supra note 276, at 9.
288 Id.
289 CITY OF DETROIT & DETROIT INST. OF ARTS, supra note 285, at 9.
290 Id. at 8. At a panel discussion about the DIA hosted by the International Foundation for
Art Research, Graham Beal, Director of the DIA, stated: "90% of our collection, despite
the City of Detroit purchases, comes from gifts." Graham W.j. Beal, Art for Sale? Bank-
ruptcy and the Detroit Institute of Arts: The Director's Take, 14 IFAR JOURNAL 42-43 (2014).
Another panelist, Samuel Sachs II, a former Director of the DIA, stated: "there are a few
works of art in the collection that have a 'remainderman clause.' They were given with
the understanding that they will never be sold, and if the museum does want to sell them,
that the work will go to some other recipient. I expect that we may see more of such
clauses in the future." Id. at 57.
291 Michigan Attorney General Opinion, supra note 276, at 20 n.14.
292 The implications of this distinction are obviously quite significant for the deaccessioning
debates. See supra Part II.D.2; Michigan Attorney General Opinion, supra note 276, at 9.
293 Michigan Attorney General Opinion, supra note 276, at 3 (emphasis added).
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the city made "no material change in its [the museum's] character as
a private corporation.",14 Non-profit corporations certainly have fiduci-
ary duties to the public,29 5 and the statute places some other affirma-
tive duties on the museum.'" However, the statute ultimately creates
nothing more exotic than a garden variety non-profit corporation;
the environmental public trust doctrine does not apply in its current
state.
A non-profit corporation does not inherently go against its mission
(nor thereby invalidate its non-profit status) by selling, for instance, a
single piece of artwork. 9 7 In some instances, doing so may be neces-
sary to promote the non-profit's mission (for example, to cull artwork
of poor quality in order to purchase artworks of higher quality) .29 In
fact, a museum operating as a non-profit corporation need not neces-
sarily have a collection at all in order to fulfill its duties to educate the
public-some museums (for instance, the Contemporary Arts Center
in Cincinnati, Ohio) have no permanent collection, but instead serve
as art exhibition spaces.299 While the authorizing statute does require
museums incorporated under it to publicly exhibit their collections
of art, it is going too far to state that once an artwork becomes a part
of the collection it must as a matter of law be displayed in perpetui-
t 300ty.so
The Michigan Attorney General also argued that if any part of the
collection is held in charitable trust, then the entire collection
should be:
294 Detroit Museum of Art v. Engel, 153 N.W. 700, 703 (Mich. 1915).
295 See supra Part II.A.
296 "The public exhibition of its collection of works of art shall be the duty of every such corporation,
and . .. it shall ... open its buildings and art collection to the general public." Michigan Attor-
ney General Opinion, supra note 276, at 3 (quoting 1885 PA 3, §§ 3-4, CL 1915, §§
10761-62).
297 Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., AAMD POLICY ON DEACCEssIONING 1, 3 (2010) ("Most art
museums continue to build and shape their collections over time to realize more fully
and effectively their mission."); id. ("Deaccessioning is a legitimate part of the formation
and care of collections and, if practiced, should be done in order to refine and improve
the quality and appropriateness of the collections, the better to serve the museum's mis-
sion.").
298 Id. at 3.
299 "The Contemporary Arts Center is a non-collecting institution. Without a collection, all
exhibitions on view are temporary and ever-changing." CONTEMPORARY ARTS CENTER,
http://contemporaryartscenter.org/visit/hours-admission (last visited Oct. 4 2014).
300 The DIA describes its own collection as "encyclopedic"; its 60,000-item collection far ex-
ceeds available display space (as is true of many art museums). The Science and Techniques
of Art Preservation, DETROIT INSTITUTE OF ARTS, http://www.dia.org/art/conservation-
department.aspx; Collections, DETROIT INSTITUTE OF ARTS, http://www.dia.org/art/; see
also ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING, supra note 297, at 1,
3.
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In accepting the trust ... the City agreed at its own cost and expense to
maintain and operate the trust .... Over the years, the museum's art col-
lection grew through charitable donations of art and direct purchases by
the City. As new pieces were added to the collection, the entire collection
continued to be dedicated towards the museum's initial charitable pur-
pose: the public display of its art collection.o1
The Attorney General concluded that the suggestion that the art
acquired by the museum was held in trust while the art purchased by
the city was not is "untenable"-if this were so, he argued, then chari-
table assets would have been unlawfully commingled with non-
charitable assets, thereby breaching the trust."'
The argument is incorrect for a number of basic reasons. Display-
ing art from a variety of sources in the same space is a routine prac-
tice of art museums. Museums routinely lend art to one another for
purposes of a special exhibition. Displaying individual artworks near
one another certainly cannot be said to inherently violate the fiduci-
ary duties of those organizations as would depositing client funds into
an attorney account. Any concern about commingling artwork would
in almost any instance be easily overcome by basic record-keeping.
In addition to competing obligations to the city, taxpayers, and
donors, the DIA was forced to consider its professional obligations.3 3
Violating professional ethics codes can lead to significant practical
consequences. For example, in 2008, the National Academy Museum
in New York deaccessioned artwork to pay its bills, and was "branded
a pariah" when the AAMD urged its member institutions not to col-
laborate with the museum. More recently, the AAMD sanctioned
the Delaware Art Museum, which sold its 1868 William Holman Hunt
painting Isabella and the Pot of Basil at a Christie's auction for $4.25
million as a way to bolster its endowment and pay down debts.305 The
301 Michigan Attorney General Opinion, supra note 276, at *20.
302 Id. at *21 n.16.
303 In his opinion, the Michigan Attorney General references the AAM and ICOM codes of
ethics in support of his argument that the artwork may not be sold. Michigan Attorney
General Opinion, supra note 276 at *10-12. It should be noted that these codes of conduct
do not have the force of law-they are standards promulgated by professional organiza-
tions that, like any organization, have a self-interest in developing standards that are ben-
eficial to their most influential members.
304 Robin Pogrebin, Branded a Pariah, the National Academy Is Struggling to Survive, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/arts/design/23acad.html. But see
Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Art of the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A21 ("If the choice is
between allowing a museum to fail (or make crippling cutbacks) and selling some art,
what's the big deal? Sell art!").
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THE "PUBLIC TRUST"
AAMD also withdrew the Delaware Art Museum's accredited status
for "direct violation of museum standards and ethics."30 In addition
to losing professional credibility, the Delaware Art Museum is now
ineligible to accept exhibition loans from any other member muse-
um.0 7 In a written statement, the AAMD chastised the museum for
"violat[ing] one of the most basic and important of AAMD's princi-
ples."08 Though the museum argued that it was forced to sell the
painting or close its doors, the AAMD responded by saying that "the
museum is treating works from its collection as disposable assets, ra-
ther than irreplaceable cultural heritage that it holds in trust for
people now and in the future. It also is sending a clear signal to its
audiences that private support is unnecessary, since it can always sell
additional items from its collection to cover its costs."'"
In addition to the possibility of losing professional standing, op-
ponents of deaccessioning in Detroit maintained that it would hurt
the city's chances of revival and equates to selling off part of the city's
cultural heritage.3 0 Of course, the DIA's most basic duty is to educate
the community-a duty that was severely threatened by the prospect
of selling its collection.3 " Nonetheless, proponents of each viewpoint
argued their way was the best way to preserve the public trust, what-
ever their conception of that term may be.312 In the end, the city re-
tained all of its art.
(June 18, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-aamd-
sanctions-delaware-art-museum-selling-hunt-painting-20140618-story.html.
306 Vankin, supra note 305.
307 Miller, supra note 305.
308 Id.
309 Id. Many British museums are also facing difficult choices. The U.K. Museums Associa-
tion withdrew accreditation status from a museum in Northampton after it sold a statue
worth £15.8 million to fund a major expansion. Nick Clark, British Museums Warned Not to
Sell the Family Silver, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 28, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/
arts-entertainment/art/news/british-museums-warned-not-to-sel-the-family-silver-
9946631.html.
310 Kennedy, supra note 274.
311 Kreder, supra note 242, at 14.
312 Culture blogger Lee Rosenbaum argues that AAMD sanctions do little to curtail rogue
deaccessioning practices. Lee Rosenbaum, Damning DAM: AAMD Sanctimoniously Sanc-
tions the Delaware Art Museum, CULTURE GRRL (June 18, 2014)
http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2014/06/damning-dam-aamd-sanctimoniously-
sanctions-the-delaware-art-museum.html ("The only way that professional sanctions may
have some bite is if they have an economic impact on the institutions that are using to
[sic] wrongful methods to right their finances."). Forbidding its member organizations
to associate professionally with the shunned museum only harms art museums' collective
cultural endeavor. To many museums, the prospect of righting the ship financially is en-
ticing enough to risk weathering the (usually temporary) sanctions. Rosenbaum argues
that legislation would be a more effective deterrent, a solution that the museum commu-
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3. Conclusion
In sum, despite use of the term "public trust" in recent litigation,
in the museum context it amounts to an ethical ideal, not a legal
standard. While desire to maintain collections for public viewing is
understandable, the rhetoric should not be used to justify refusal to
allow objective evaluation of restitution claims or even to avoid deac-
cessioning even being thrust upon the museum. In no case to date
could the argument credibly apply.
CONCLUSION
Frankly, it seems as if no one really knows the meaning of the
term "public Trust." Existing scholarship provides essentially no
analysis of the term used in the No Religious Test Clause of Article's
VI of the U.S. Constitution. Historical context and evidence of the
term's meaning can be found in common law, scholarship and rheto-
ric pre-dating the Constitution's ratification, however.
A key social fact of the colonial era was its religious diversity, and
the risk it posed for democratic government at the federal level. A
fiduciary-type obligation on public officials vis-I-vis the governed was
a key concept at the time and espoused by such theorists as John
Locke. This seems to be the bedrock definitional principle behind
the term "public Trust" as used in Article VI, clause 3.
Fiduciary and trust principles are grounded in statutes and com-
mon law dating back to the reign of the Stuarts. Some cases and
scholars have used the term "public trust" outside the pure trust con-
text in only three distinct areas of law-environmental law, tax law,
and museum law. The term seems not to have been used in any oth-
er legal fields.
First, in the environmental law arena, the term has been used to
describe property administered by the government for public benefit,
not routine use as any private entity could use property. If such
property has been conveyed or otherwise delegated by the govern-
ment to a private entity, the property remains burdened by the obli-
gation to use the property solely to benefit the governed populace,
nity has long resisted. Id. As AAMD director Christine Anagnos stated to the LA. Times,
"Non-profits such as museums are already governed by many laws, at both the state and
federal level. Where an issue as complex and specific as deaccessioning is concerned, our
view is that the professional standards of the art museum field are best established and re-
inforced by those working in the field." Carolina A. Miranda, Museums Behaving Badly:




i.e. the public. The duties attached to such administration mirror the
development of those attached to private and public trusts. The con-
cept has been espoused in case law and scholarship to encompass
natural resources, including wildlife. There is a chance that the fed-
eral or a state government could transfer public property for admin-
istration by an entity with (or without) a religious mission or that the
environmental public trust doctrine could evolve beyond its envi-
ronmental roots to apply to administration of governmental benefits.
If so, there is potential for future jurisprudence to apply the No Reli-
gious Test Clause to such an administrative arrangement.
Second, in the tax area, exemptions were developed primarily for
the purpose of encouraging non-profit entities to fulfill societal needs
without the need for direct governmental funding. Although tax ex-
emptions amount to an indirect subsidization by government of the
private entities, churches and religious organizations are routine re-
cipients of such tax benefits. Under current law, such generic gov-
ernmental support (without more) is not considered to cross the
boundary of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. This
probably has to do with the fact that the primary motivation for the
tax exemptions seems historically to have been societal benefit unre-
lated to religious teaching. The classic example would be feeding the
poor. Yet, there is theoretical potential for such tax exemptions to
violate the U.S. Constitution, Article VI. If such an allegation is taken
up in any depth by a court, the court likely will need to resolve corre-
lating Free Exercise arguments that would arise if current or future
tax exemptions were denied to a church or religious organization
otherwise satisfying public needs in a manner on par with non-
religious exempt entities. Thus, there is potential in the field of tax
exemptions to interpret the No Religious Test Clause, as well as its in-
tersection with the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment.
Third, in the area of museum law, the term has been used to sup-
port development of museum ethics codes applicable to museums'
treatment of their collections, and two cases have attempted to insu-
late a museum collection using public trust principles. It is common-
ly said in the context of debates surrounding repatriation and deac-
cessioning that the museums hold their collections "in the public
trust." While fiduciary obligations do, indeed, apply to trustees ad-
ministering museums established via trusts, routine corporate duties
(which in many jurisdictions are heightened in the non-profit con-
text) apply to museums set up as non-profit entities. No special "pub-
lic trust" doctrine applies to these run-of-the-mill non-profit entities
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as a legal matter, despite the vaulted status museums may have in
American society.
Fourth, despite the fact that the term "public Trust" had been al-
together undefined up until this Article's publishing, a consistent
unifying principle in the common law trust law throughout the Stuart
Period and colonial era, as well as in the tax and environmental
fields, is that a trust or other non-profit entity is accountable under
law to fulfill an obligation to satisfy (in actuality or theoretically) a
need for services not otherwise supplied by the government. This
commonality is lacking in the museum law arena; such rhetoric has
been used therein basically to describe non-profit corporate or pri-
vate trust status, which is not the same as a "public Trust." This leads
to the conclusion that a "public Trust" can be defined as "any entity
given special privilege by the government, beyond the simple grant of
a state corporate charter often coupled with state or federal tax waiv-
ers, so long as that entity is legally obligated to engage in conduct
that could traditionally have been performed by the government it-
self for the public's benefit."
In conclusion, this definition can provide the foundation for fu-
ture litigation, legal analysis and scholarship in the non-profit, envi-
ronmental, tax, and museum law arenas. It is possible that new, pres-
ently unknown legal fields may emerge wherein this term is
important. Perhaps most importantly, the definition is necessary to
understand the final two, seemingly overlooked, words of the No Re-
ligious Test Clause in Article VI, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.
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